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Abstract
A polar coding scheme is proposed for the Wiretap Broadcast Channel with two legitimate receivers
and one eavesdropper. We consider a model in which the transmitter wishes to send different confidential
(and non-confidential) information to each legitimate receiver. First, we compare two inner-bounds on
the achievable region of this model from the literature, and then we design a polar coding scheme that
achieves the stronger one. In the proposed scheme, the encoding uses polar-based Marton’s coding, where
one inner-layer must be reliably decoded by both legitimate receivers, and each receiver must decode
its own corresponding outer-layer. Due to the non-degradedness condition of the broadcast channel, the
encoder builds a chaining construction that induces bidirectional dependencies between adjacent blocks.
Indeed, these dependencies can occur between different encoding layers of different blocks. The use of
two secret-keys, whose length are negligible in terms of rate, are required to prove that the polar code
satisfies the strong secrecy condition.
Index Terms
Polar codes, information-theoretic security, wiretap channel, broadcast channel, strong secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on a channel model over the Wiretap Broadcast Channel (WTBC) where trans-
mitter wants to reliably send different confidential (and non-confidential) messages to different legitimate
receivers with the presence of an eavesdropper. This model generalizes the one described in [1], where
only common information is intended for both receivers.
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2There are two different inner-bounds on the achievable region of this model in the literature. On the
one hand, the inner-bound found in [2] considers confidential information only, while the one in [3]
consider confidential and non-confidential messages. The random coding techniques used in [2] and [3]
are Marton’s coding and rate splitting in conjunction with superposition coding and binning. The only
difference between them is that the first uses joint decoding, while the second uses successive decoding.
Indeed, if we consider confidential information transmission only, the inner-bound in [2] includes the one
in [3], but is not straightforward to show that whether the first inner-bound is strictly larger or not: for a
given input distribution, the inner-bound in [2] is strictly larger; nevertheless, we do not know if the rate
points that are only included in this inner-bound for a particular distribution may be in the inner-bound
found in [3] under another distribution.
We provide a Polar Coding Scheme (PCS) that achieves the inner-bound in [2] and, additionally, allows
transmitting different non-confidential messages to both legitimate receivers. Our PCS is based in part on
the one described in [4] that achieves Marton’s region of broadcast channels without secrecy constraints,
and the one in [1] for the Common Information over the Wiretap Broadcast Channel (CI-WTBC). In
Marton’s coding we have three different layers: one inner-layer that must be reliably decoded by both
legitimate receivers, and two outer-layers such that each one conveys information intended only for one
receiver. Due to the non-degradedness condition of the channels, the PCS requires the use of a chaining
construction which induces bidirectional dependencies between adjacent blocks. Moreover, we show that
joint and successive decoding have their counterpart in polar coding, and jointly decoding allows to
enlarge the achievable region for a particular input distribution. Indeed, due to the polar-based jointly
decoding, our PCS needs to build a chaining construction that introduces dependencies between different
encoding layers of adjacent blocks.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section II introduces the channel model formally
as well as an enlarged version of the inner-bound found in [2] that considers the transmission of private
messages. In Section IV we describe a PCS that achieves this inner-bound. Then, Section V evaluates
the performance of this PCS. Finally, the concluding remarks are presented in Section VI.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND ACHIEVABLE REGION
A WTBC (X , pY(1)Y(2)Z|X ,Y(1)×Y(2)×Z) with 2 legitimate receivers and an external eavesdropper, as
we have seen in the previous chapter, is characterized by the probability transition function pY(1)Y(2)Z|X ,
where X ∈ X denotes the channel input, Y(k) ∈ Y(k) denotes the channel output corresponding to the
legitimate receiver k ∈ [1, 2], and Z ∈ Z denotes the channel output corresponding to the eavesdropper.
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3We consider a model, namely Multiple Information over the Wiretap Broadcast Channel (MI-WTBC), in
which the transmitter wishes to send two private messages W1 and W2, and two confidential messages
S1 and S2, where W1 and S1 are intended to legitimate Receiver 1, and W2 and S2 are intended to
legitimate Receiver 2. A code
(d2nRW(1) e, d2nRS(1) e, d2nRW(2) e, d2nRS(2) e, n) for the MI-WTBC consists
of two private message sets W(1) and W(2) where W(k) ,
[
1, d2nRW(k) e] for k ∈ [1, 2], two confidential
message sets S(1) and S(2) where S(k) ,
[
1, d2nRS(k) e] for k ∈ [1, 2], an encoding function f : W(1) ×
S(1)×W(2)×S(2) → X n that maps (w(1), w(2), s(1), s(2)) to a codeword xn, and two decoding functions
g(1) and g(2) such that g(k) : Yn(k) →W(k)×S(k) (k ∈ [1, 2]) maps the k-th legitimate receiver observations
yn(k) to the estimates (wˆ(k), sˆ(k)). The reliability condition to be satisfied by this code is given by
lim
n→∞P
[
(W(k), S(k)) 6= (Wˆ(k), Sˆ(k))
]
= 0, k ∈ [1, 2]. (1)
The strong secrecy condition is measured in terms of the information leakage and is given by
lim
n→∞ I
(
S(1)S(2);Z
n
)
= 0. (2)
This model is plotted in Figure 1. A tuple of rates (RW(1) , RS(1) , RW(2) , RS(2)) ∈ R4+ is achievable for the
MI-WTBC if a sequence of
(d2nRW(1) e, d2nRS(1) e, d2nRW(2) e, d2nRS(2) e, n) codes that satisfy the reliability
and secrecy conditions (1) and (2) respectively exists.
(W(1), S(1),W(2), S(2))
Encoder
Xn
Receiver 1
Receiver 2
Eavesdropper
WTBC
pY(1)Y(2)Z|X
(Wˆ(1), Sˆ(1))
(Wˆ(2), Sˆ(2))

XXXXX(S(1), S(2))
Fig. 1. Channel model: MI-WTBC.
References [2] and [3] define two different inner-bounds on the capacity region of this model. Indeed,
the inner-bound in [2] only consider the case where RW(1) = RW(2) , 0, that is, when only confidential
messages are transmitted over the broadcast channel. In this situation, [2] (Remark 3) points out that this
inner-bound includes the one defined in [3], but it does not specify whether this bound is strictly larger
or not.
Definition 1 (Adapted from [2]). The region R(S)MI-WTBC defined by the union over all the pairs of rates
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4(RS(1) , RS(2)) ∈ R2+ satisfying
RS(1) ≤ I(V U(1);Y(1))− I(V U(1);Z)
RS(2) ≤ I(V U(2);Y(2))− I(V U(2);Z)
RS(1) +RS(2) ≤ I(V U(1);Y(1)) + I(V U(2);Y(2))− I(U(1);U(2)|V )
− I(V U(1)U(2);Z)−max{I(V ;Y(1)), I(V ;Y(2)), I(V ;Z)}
for some distribution pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z such that (V U(1)U(2)) − X − (Y(1), Y(2), Z) forms a Markov
chain and I(U(1);Y(1)|V ) + I(U(2);Y(2)|V ) ≥ I(U(1);U(2)|V ), defines an inner-bound on the achievable
region of the MI-WTBC when RW(1) = RW(2) , 0.
Remark 1. Since the previous inner-bound on the achievable region of the MI-WTBC cannot be enlarged
by considering general distributions pX|V U(1)U(2) , the channel input X can be restricted to be any
deterministic function of random variables (V U(1)U(2)).
Remark 2. If Z , ∅ then region R(S)MI-WTBC reduces to well-known Marton’s region for the broadcast
channel without secrecy constraints [5].
Proposition 1. When RW(1) = RW(2) , 0, for a particular distribution pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z , R
(S)
MI-WTBC in
Proposition 1 is strictly larger than the inner-bound in [3] (Theorem 1).
Proof. ConsiderR(S)MI-WTBC when pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z is such that I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Y(2)). In this case, it is
easy to check that the inner-bound in [3] (Theorem 1) imposes that RS(2) ≤ I(V ;Y(1))+I(U(2);Y(2)|V )−
I(V U(2);Z), which is strictly less than the bound on RS(2) in Proposition 1. Similarly, the upper-bound
on RS(1) in Proposition 1 is also strictly larger than the one in [3] (Theorem 1) when I(V ;Y(2)) <
I(V ;Y(1)).
Remark 3. In general, we cannot affirm that the inner-bound in Proposition 1 is strictly larger than the
one in [3]: the rate tuples that are included only in Proposition 1 for a particular distribution may be
in the inner-bound of [3] under another distribution.
Remark 4. The region in [3] imposes that I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(k)) for any k ∈ [1, 2]. Nevertheless,
Proposition 1 does not restrict pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z to satisfy this condition.
Remark 5. As mentioned in [2] (Remark 3), the coding techniques used in [2] and [3] to obtain the
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5inner-bounds are almost the same and the only difference are the decoding strategies: joint decoding
in [2] and successive decoding for [3]. Indeed, we will see that these strategies have a connection on
the PCS that is described in Section IV and joint decoding enlarges the inner-bound on the achievable
region for a particular distribution.
For compactness of notation, let k ∈ [1, 2], and k¯ , [1, 2] \ k. The following proposition defines an
inner-bound on the achievable region for the MI-WTBC when considering also the transmission of the
private messages W(1) and W(2).
Proposition 2. The region RMI-WTBC , Conv
(
R
(1)
MI-WTBC ∪ R(2)MI-WTBC
)
defines an inner-bound on the
achievable region of the MI-WTBC, where Conv(·) denotes the convex hull of a set of rate-tuples, for
k ∈ [1, 2] we have
R
(k)
MI-WTBC
,
⋃
P

RS(k)≤ I(V U(k);Y(k))− I(V U(k);Z)
RS(k¯)≤ I(V U(k¯);Y(k¯))− I(U(k¯);U(k)|V )− I(U(k¯);Z|V U(k))
−max{I(V ;Y(1)), I(V ;Y(2)), I(V ;Z)}
RS(k) +RW(k)≤ I(V U(k);Y(k))
RS(k¯) +RW(k¯)≤ I(V U(k¯);Y(k¯))− I(U(k¯);U(k)|V )
−max{I(V ;Y(1)), I(V ;Y(2)), I(V ;Z)}+ I(V ;Z),

,
and P contains all distributions pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z such that (V U(1)U(2))−X − (Y(1), Y(2), Z) forms a
Markov chain and I(U(1);Y(1)|V ) + I(U(2);Y(2)|V ) ≥ I(U(1);U(2)|V ).
In Section IV we describe a PCS that achieves the corner point of R(k)MI-WTBC, where k ∈ [1, 2], and
then we discuss how to achieve any rate tuple of the entire region RMI-WTBC.
III. REVIEW OF POLAR CODES
Let (X × Y, pXY ) be a Discrete Memoryless Source (DMS), where1 X ∈ {0, 1} and Y ∈ Y . The
polar transform over the n-sequence Xn, n being any power of 2, is defined as Un , XnGn, where
Gn ,
[
1 1
1 0
]⊗n is the source polarization matrix [8]. Since Gn = G−1n , then Xn = UnGn.
The polarization theorem for source coding with side information [8, Theorem 1] states that the polar
transform extracts the randomness of Xn in the sense that, as n→∞, the set of indices j ∈ [1, n] can
1Throughout this paper, we assume binary polarization. Nevertheless, an extension to q-ary alphabets is possible [6], [7].
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6be divided practically into two disjoint sets, namely H(n)X|Y and L
(n)
X|Y , such that U(j) for j ∈ H
(n)
X|Y is
practically independent of (U1:j−1, Y n) and uniformly distributed, that is, H(U(j)|U1:j−1, Y n)→ 1, and
U(j) for j ∈ L(n)X|Y is almost determined by (U1:j−1, Y n), which means that H(U(j)|U1:j−1, Y n)→ 0.
Formally, let δn , 2−n
β
, where β ∈ (0, 12), and
H(n)X|Y ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(U(j) ∣∣U1:j−1, Y n) ≥ 1− δn} ,
L(n)X|Y ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(U(j) ∣∣U1:j−1, Y n) ≤ δn} .
Then, by [8, Theorem 1] we have limn→∞ 1n |H
(n)
X|Y | = H(X|Y ) and limn→∞ 1n |L
(n)
X|Y | = 1−H(X|Y ).
Consequently, the number of elements U(j) that have not polarized is asymptotically negligible in terms
of rate, that is, limn→∞ 1n |(H
(n)
X|Y )
C \ L(n)X|Y | = 0.
Furthermore, [8, Theorem 2] states that given the part U [(L(n)X|Y )C] and the channel output observations
Y n, the remaining part U [L(n)X|Y ] can be reconstructed by using SC decoding with error probability in
O(nδn).
Similarly toH(n)X|Y and L
(n)
X|Y , the setsH
(n)
X and L(n)X can be defined by considering that the observations
Y n are absent. Since conditioning does not increase the entropy, we have H(n)X ⊇ H(n)X|Y and L
(n)
X ⊆
L(n)X|Y . A discrete memoryless channel (X , pY |X ,Y) with some arbitrary pX can be seen as a DMS
(X ×Y, pXpY |X). In channel polar coding, first we define the sets of indices H(n)X|Y , L
(n)
X|Y , H
(n)
X and L(n)X
from the target distribution pXpY |X . Then, based on the previous sets, the encoder somehow constructs2
U˜n and applies the inverse polar transform X˜n = U˜nGn. Afterwards, the transmitter sends X˜n over the
channel, which induces Y˜ n. Let (X˜n, Y˜ n) ∼ q˜Xn q˜Y n|Xn , if V(q˜XnY n , pXnY n)→ 0 then the receiver can
reliably reconstruct U˜ [L(n)X|Y ] from Y˜ n and U˜ [(L
(n)
X|Y )
C] by performing SC decoding [9].
IV. POLAR CODING SCHEME
Notice that RMI-WTBC of Proposition 2 is not affected by switching subindices 1 and 2.Thus, we
can assume without loss of generality that I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)). Otherwise, the coding scheme that
is described later will also be suitable by simply exchanging the roles of Receiver 1 and Receiver 2.
Consequently, the PCS must contemplate three different situations:
Situation 1: when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)),
Situation 2: when I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)),
Situation 3: when I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z).
2Since the polar-based encoder will construct random variables that must approach the target distribution of the DMS,
throughout this paper we use tilde above the random variables to emphazise this purpose.
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7Under the previous assumption, in order to proof that RMI-WTBC is entirely achievable by using polar
codes for any of the situations mentioned before, it suffices to provide a PCS that achieves the corner
points (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC and (R?2S(1) , R?2S(2) , R?2W(1) , R?2W(2)) ⊂ R
(2)
MI-WTBC, where
R?kS(k) , H(V U(k)|Z)−H(V U(k)|Y(k)), (3)
R?kS(k¯) , H(U(k¯)|V U(k)Z)−H(U(k¯)|V Y(k¯))
− (H(V |Y(k¯))−min{H(V |Y(1)), H(V |Z)}), (4)
R?kW(k) , H(V U(k))−H(V U(k)|Z), (5)
R?kW(k¯) , H(U(k¯)|V U(k))−H(U(k¯)|V U(k)Z). (6)
for any k ∈ [1, 2], and recall that k¯ = [1, 2] \ k. We have expressed (R?kS(1) , R?kS(2) , R?kW(1) , R?kW(2)) in terms
of entropies for convenience. Indeed, (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) corresponds to the case where, for a
given distribution pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z , we set the maximum rate for the confidential and private messages
intended for Receiver k, and then we set the maximum possible rates of the remaining messages associated
to Receiver k¯.
Remark 6. For distributions such that I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Y(2)), the inner-bound in [3] does not include
the corner point (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
). In this section we will see that polar-based joint decoding
is necessary for the PCS to approach this rate tuple.
Moreover, distributions pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z such that satisfy Situations 2 and 3, that is when I(V ;Y(k)) <
I(V ;Z) for some k ∈ [1, 2], are not considered in the definition of the inner-bound [3]. In order to
approach (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
), for any k ∈ [1, 2], we will see that polar-based joint decoding is
also needed in these situations.
Let (V × U(1) × U(2) × X × Y(1) × Y(2) × Z, pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z) denote the Discrete Memoryless
Source (DMS) that represents the input (V,U(1), U(2), X) and output (Y(1), Y(2), Z) random variables of
the MI-WTBC, where |V| = |U(1)| = |U(2)| = |X | , 2. For the input random variable V , we define the
polar transform An , V nGn and the associated sets
H(n)V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(A(j)∣∣A1:j−1) ≥ 1− δn}, (7)
L(n)V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(A(j)∣∣A1:j−1) ≤ δn}, (8)
H(n)V |Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(A(j)∣∣A1:j−1Zn) ≥ 1− δn}, (9)
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8L(n)V |Y(k) ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(A(j)∣∣A1:j−1Y n(k)) ≤ δn}, k = 1, 2. (10)
For the random variable U(k), where k ∈ [1, 2], we define the polar transform Tn(k) , Un(k)Gn. In
this model, due to the polar-based Marton’s coding strategy similar to the one in [4], the polar code
constructions corresponding to Tn(1) and T
n
(2) are different depending on the corner point that the PCS
must approach. To achieve (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
), the construction of Tn(1) only depends on V
n,
while Tn(2) depends on V
n and Tn(1). Otherwise, to achieve (R
?2
S(1)
, R?2S(2) , R
?2
W(1)
, R?2W(2)), the construction
of Tn(2) only depends on V
n, while the one of Tn(1) depends on V
n and Tn(2). Therefore, consider that the
PCS must achieve (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ⊆ R(k)MI-WTBC, where k ∈ [1, 2]. Associated to U(k), define
H(n)U(k)|V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(T(k)(j)∣∣T 1:j−1(k) V n) ≥ 1− δn}, (11)
L(n)U(k)|V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(T(k)(j)∣∣T 1:j−1(k) V n) ≤ δn}, (12)
H(n)U(k)|V Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(T(k)(j)∣∣T 1:j−1(k) V nZn) ≥ 1− δn}, (13)
L(n)U(k)|V Y(k) ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(T(k)(j)∣∣T 1:j−1(k) V nY n(k)) ≤ δn}. (14)
Also, define the following sets associated to the polar transform U(k¯):
H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k) ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(T(k¯)(j)∣∣T 1:j−1(k¯) V nUn(k)) ≥ 1− δn}, (15)
L(n)U(k¯)|V U(k) ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(T(k¯)(j)∣∣T 1:j−1(k¯) V nUn(k)) ≤ δn}, (16)
H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(T(k¯)(j)∣∣T 1:j−1(k¯) V nUn(k)Zn) ≥ 1− δn}, (17)
L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯) ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(T(k¯)(j)∣∣T 1:j−1(k¯) V nY n(k¯)) ≤ δn}. (18)
Consider that the encoding takes place over L blocks indexed by i ∈ [1, L]. In order to approach
the corner point (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
), where k ∈ [1, 2], at Block i ∈ [1, L] the encoder will
construct A˜ni , which will carry part of the confidential and private message that is intended for legitimate
Receiver k. Additionally, the encoder will store into A˜ni some elements from A˜
n
i−1 (if i ∈ [2, L]) and
A˜ni+1 (if i ∈ [1, L − 1]) so that both legitimate receivers are able to reliably reconstruct A˜n1:L (chaining
construction). Then, the encoder first constructs T˜n(k),i, which will depend on V˜
n
i = A˜
n
i Gn and will carry
the remaining parts of the confidential and private messages intended for Receiver k. Indeed, it could
also depend on V˜ ni−1 and/or V˜
n
i+1 if polar-based jointly decoding is considered because some elements of
V˜ ni−1 and/or V˜
n
i+1 may be stored in T˜
n
(k),i. Then, the encoder forms T˜
n
(k¯),i
, which depends on
(
V˜ ni , T˜
n
(k),i
)
.
In fact, as before, if polar-based jointly decoding is considered then the chaining construction may store
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9some elements of V˜ ni−1 and/or V˜
n
i+1 in T˜
n
(k¯),i
. Finally, it will obtain U˜n(k),i = T˜
n
(k),iGn for k ∈ [1, 2]
and deterministically form X˜ni (see Remark 1). The codeword X˜
n then is transmitted over the WTBC
inducing the channel outputs (Y˜ n(1),i, Y˜
n
(2),i, Z˜
n
i ).
For better readability and understanding, the methods of constructing the inner-layer A˜n1:L and the
outer-layers T˜n(1),1:L and T˜
n
(2),1:L are described independently in the following subsections. Nevertheless,
if we consider the encoding moving from Block 1 to Block L, and since dependencies only occur between
adjacent blocks, the encoder is able to form T˜n(1),i and T˜
n
(2),i once A˜
n
i+1 (i ∈ [1, L− 1]) is constructed.
A. Construction of the inner-layer
The method of forming A˜n1:L is very similar to the one described in [1]. Besides the sets in (7)–(10),
we define G(n) , H(n)V |Z and C(n) , H
(n)
V ∩
(H(n)V |Z)C, which form a partition of H(n)V . Moreover, we also
define the following partition of the set G(n):
G(n)0 , G(n) ∩ L(n)V |Y(1) ∩ L
(n)
V |Y(2) , (19)
G(n)1 , G(n) ∩
(L(n)V |Y(1))C ∩ L(n)V |Y(2) , (20)
G(n)2 , G(n) ∩ L(n)V |Y(1) ∩
(L(n)V |Y(2))C, (21)
G(n)1,2 , G(n) ∩
(L(n)V |Y(1))C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C, (22)
and the following partition of the set C(n):
C(n)0 , C(n) ∩ L(n)V |Y(1) ∩ L
(n)
V |Y(2) , (23)
C(n)1 , C(n) ∩
(L(n)V |Y(1))C ∩ L(n)V |Y(2) , (24)
C(n)2 , C(n) ∩ L(n)V |Y(1) ∩
(L(n)V |Y(2))C, (25)
C(n)1,2 , C(n) ∩
(L(n)V |Y(1))C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C. (26)
These sets are graphically represented in [1] (Figure 2).
Recall that A˜i[H(n)V ], i ∈ [1, L], is suitable for storing uniformly distributed random sequences, and
A˜i[G(n)] is suitable for storing information to be secured from the eavesdropper. Moreover, sets in (19)–
(26) with subscript k ∈ [1, 2] form H(n)V ∩
(L(n)V |Y(k))C, and the elements of A˜ni corresponding to this
set of indices are required by Receiver k to reliably reconstruct A˜ni entirely by performing Successive
Cancellation (SC) decoding.
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As mentioned before, the PCS must consider three different situations. In Situation 1 we have the
condition I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y1) ≤ I(V ;Y2). As seen in [1], for n sufficiently large this condition imposes
the following restriction on the size of previous sets:
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣; (27)
Similarly, Situation 2, where I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y2), imposes that∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ > ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣; (28)
and Situation 3, where I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y2) < I(V ;Z), imposes that∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ > ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣. (29)
Thus, according to (27)–(29), we must consider six different cases:
A. |G(n)1 | > |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | > |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | ≥ |C(n)1,2 | (only for Situation 1),
B. |G(n)1 | > |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | > |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | < |C(n)1,2 | (for all situations),
C. |G(n)1 | ≥ |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | ≤ |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | > |C(n)1,2 | (only for Situations 1 and 2),
D. |G(n)1 | < |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | < |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | > |C(n)1,2 | (for all situations),
E. |G(n)1 | > |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | < |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | < |C(n)1,2 | (only for Situations 2 and 3),
F. |G(n)1 | < |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | < |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | < |C(n)1,2 | (only for Situation 3).
The inner-layer encoding process to achieve (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
), for any k ∈ [1, 2], in all cases
is summarized in Algorithm 1. For i ∈ [1, L], let W (V )(k),i be a uniformly distributed vector of length
|C(n)| that represents part of the private message intended to legitimate Receiver k. The encoder forms
A˜i
[C(n)] by simply storing W (V )(k),i. Then, from A˜i[C(n)], we define Ψ(V )i , A˜i[C(n)2 ], Γ(V )i , A˜i[C(n)1,2 ]
and Θ(V )i , A˜i
[C(n)1 ].
The function form2_AG in Algorithm 1 constructs A˜1:L
[G(n)] and is explained in detail below. Then,
given A˜i
[C(n) ∪ G(n)], i ∈ [1, L], the encoder forms the remaining entries of A˜ni by using SC encoding:
deterministic for A˜i
[L(n)V ], and random for A˜i[(H(n)V )C \ L(n)V ].
Also, from A˜ni , where i ∈ [1, L], the encoder obtains Φ(V )(k),i , A˜i
[(H(n)V )C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C] for any
k ∈ [1, 2]. Moreover, from A˜n1 and A˜nL, it obtains Υ(V )(1) , A˜1
[H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C] and Υ(V )(2) , A˜L[H(n)V ∩
(L(n)V |Y(2))C
]
, respectively. Recall that
(
Υ
(V )
(k) ,Φ
(V )
(k),i
)
is required by legitimate Receiver k to reliably
estimate A˜n1:L. Hence, the transmitter additionally sends
(
Υ
(V )
(k) ,Φ
(V )
(k),i
)⊕κ(V )ΥΦ(k) to legitimate Receiver k,
where κ(V )ΥΦ(k) is a uniformly distributed key with size L
∣∣(H(n)V )C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣.
The function form2_AG is summarized in Algorithm 2. For any i ∈ [1, L], this function stores part
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Algorithm 1 Inner-layer encoding to achieve (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ⊆ R(k)MI-WTBC
Require: Parts W (V )(k),1:L and S
(V )
(k),1:L of messages; and secret-key {κ
(V )
ΥΦ(k)
}2k=1
1 Ψ
(V )
0 , Γ
(V )
0 , Ψ¯
(V )
0 , Π
(V )
(2),0, Λ
(V )
0 , Θ¯
(V )
L+1, Γ¯
(V )
L+1 ← ∅ . For notation purposes
2 A˜1[C(n)]←W (V )(k),1
3 Ψ
(V )
1 ← A˜1[C(n)2 ] and Γ(V )1 ← A˜1[C(n)1,2 ]
4 for i = 1 to L do
5 if i 6= L then
6 A˜i+1[C(n)]←W (V )(k),i+1
7 Ψ
(V )
i+1 ← A˜i+1[C(n)2 ] and Θ(V )i+1 ← A˜i+1[C(n)1 ] and Γ(V )i+1 ← A˜i+1[C(n)1,2 ]
8 end if
9 A˜i
[G(n)], Π(V )(1),i, Π(V )(2),i, Λ(V )i , . . .
10 . . .∆
(V )
(1),i+1,∆
(V )
(2),i−1 ← form2_AG
(
i, S
(V )
(k),i,Θ
(V )
i+1,Γ
(V )
i+1,Ψ
(V )
i−1,Γ
(V )
i−1,Π
(V )
(2),i−1,Λ
(V )
i−1
)
11 for j ∈ (H(n)V )C do
12 if j ∈ (H(n)V )C \ L(n)V then
13 A˜i(j)← pA(j)|A1:j−1
(
A˜i(j)
∣∣A˜1:j−1i )
14 else if j ∈ L(n)V then
15 A˜i(j)← arg maxa∈V pA(j)|A1:j−1
(
a
∣∣A˜1:j−1i )
16 end if
17 end for
18 V˜ ni = A˜
n
i Gn
19 Φ
(V )
(k),i ← A˜i
[(H(n)V )C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C] for k ∈ [1, 2]
20 if i = 1 then Υ(V )(1) ← A˜1
[H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C]
21 if i = L then Υ(V )(2) ← A˜L
[H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C]
22 end for
23 Send Π(1),1:L and ∆
(V )
(1),1:L to the encoding responsible for the construction of T˜
n
(1)
24 Send ∆(V )(2),1:L to the encoding responsible for the construction of T˜
n
(2)
25 Send
(
Φ
(V )
(k),i,Υ
(V )
(k)
)⊕ κ(V )ΥΦ(k) to Receiver k ∈ [1, 2]
26 return V˜ n1:L
of the confidential message intended for Receiver k ∈ [1, 2], namely S(V )(k),i, into A˜i
[G(n)], as well as
different elements of A˜ni−1 (i ∈ [2, L]) and A˜ni+1 (i ∈ [1, L − 1]) due to the chaining construction:
recall that
[
Ψ
(V )
i ,Γ
(V )
i
]
= A˜i
[C(n)2 ∪ C(n)1,2 ] is required by Receiver 2 to reliably estimate A˜ni , while[
Θ
(V )
i ,Γ
(V )
i
]
= A˜i
[C(n)1 ∪ C(n)1,2 ] is required by Receiver 1.
Notice in Algorithm 2 that if the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC then, for
i ∈ [1, L − 1], sequences Θ(V )i+1 and Γ(V )i+1 are not repeated directly in A˜i
[G(n)]. Instead, the encoder
repeats Θ¯(V )i+1 , Θ
(V )
i+1 ⊕ κ(V )Θ and Γ¯(V )i+1 , Γ(V )i+1 ⊕ κ(V )Γ , where κ(V )Θ and κ(V )Γ are uniformly distributed
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keys with length |C(n)1 | and |C(n)1,2 | respectively that are privately shared between transmitter and both
receivers. Otherwise, to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC, instead of Ψ
(V )
i−1 and Γ
(V )
i−1, i ∈ [2, L], the
encoder repeats Ψ¯(V )i−1 , Ψ
(V )
i−1 ⊕ κ(V )Ψ and Γ¯(V )i−1 , Γ(V )i−1 ⊕ κ(V )Γ , where κ(V )Ψ is a distributed key with
length |C(n)2 |. Since these keys are reused in all blocks, clearly their size become negligible in terms of
rate for L large enough.
As in [1], based on the sets in (19)–(26), let R(n)1 , R′(n)1 , R(n)2 , R′(n)2 , R(n)1,2 , R′(n)1,2 , I(n), R(n)S and
R(n)Λ form an additional partition of G(n). The definition of R(n)1 , R′(n)1 , R(n)2 , R′(n)2 , R(n)1,2 and R′(n)1,2
will depend on the particular case (among A to F) and situation (among 1 to 3), as well as on the corner
point the PCS must approach. Then, we define
R(n)S , any subset of G(n)1 \
(R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 ) with size ∣∣G(n)2 \ (R(n)1 ∪R′(n)1 )∣∣. (30)
Finally, the definition of I(n) and R(n)Λ depend on the corner point the PCS must achieve: if the corner
point is (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC then
I(n) , (G(n)0 ∪ G(n)2 ) \ (R(n)1 ∪R′(n)1 ∪R(n)1,2 ∪R′(n)1,2 ), (31)
R(n)Λ , G(n)1,2 ∪
(G(n)1 \ (R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 ∪R(n)S )); (32)
and if it is (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC then we define
I(n) , (G(n)0 ∪ G(n)1 ∪ G(n)2 ) \ (R(n)1 ∪R′(n)1 ∪R(n)1,2 ∪R′(n)1,2 ∪R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 ∪R(n)S )), (33)
R(n)Λ , G(n)1,2 . (34)
Note that G(n)1 \
(R(n)2 ∪ R′(n)2 ∪ R(n)S ) will belong to I(n) or R(n)Λ depending on whether the PCS
approaches the first or the second corner point, respectively. Based on these sets, define
Λ
(V )
i , A˜i
[R(n)Λ ], (35)
Π
(V )
(2),i , A˜i
[G(n)2 ∩ I(n)], (36)
Π
(V )
(1),i , A˜i
[G(n)1 ∩ I(n)]. (37)
Indeed, note that Π(V )(1),i 6= ∅ only when the PCS must approach the corner point of R
(2)
MI-WTBC.
Also, let S(V )(k),i be a uniform random sequence representing the part of the confidential message intended
for Receiver k ∈ [1, 2] that is carried in the inner-layer. Then, S(V )(k),1 has size
∣∣I(n) ∪ G(n)1,2 ∪ G(n)1 ∣∣; for
i ∈ [2, L− 1], S(V )(k),i has size
∣∣I(n)∣∣; and S(V )(k),L has size ∣∣I(n) ∪ G(n)2 ∣∣.
Moreover, for i ∈ [1, L] we write Ψ(V )i ,
[
Ψ
(V )
1,i ,Ψ
(V )
2,i ,Ψ
(V )
3,i
]
and Ψ¯(V )i ,
[
Ψ¯
(V )
1,i , Ψ¯
(V )
2,i , Ψ¯
(V )
3,i
]
, we write
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Θ
(V )
i ,
[
Θ
(V )
1,i ,Θ
(V )
2,i ,Θ
(V )
3,i
]
and Θ¯(V )i ,
[
Θ¯
(V )
1,i , Θ¯
(V )
2,i , Θ¯
(V )
3,i
]
, and we write Γ(V )i ,
[
Γ
(V )
1,i ,Γ
(V )
2,i ,Γ
(V )
3,i
]
and
Γ¯
(V )
i ,
[
Γ¯
(V )
1,i , Γ¯
(V )
2,i , Γ¯
(V )
3,i
]
, where we will define Ψ(V )p,i , Ψ¯
(V )
p,i , Θ
(V )
p,i , Θ¯
(V )
p,i , Γ
(V )
p,i and Γ¯
(V )
p,i , for any p ∈
[1, 2, 3], accordingly in each case. For notation purposes, let
∆
(V )
(1),i ,
[
Θ¯
(V )
3,i , Γ¯
(V )
3,i
]
and ∆(V )(2),i ,
[
Ψ
(V )
3,i ,Γ
(V )
3,i
]
(if k = 1), (38)
∆
(V )
(1),i ,
[
Θ
(V )
3,i ,Γ
(V )
3,i
]
and ∆(V )(2),i ,
[
Ψ¯
(V )
3,i , Γ¯
(V )
3,i
]
(if k = 2). (39)
According to Algorithm 1, recall that Π(V )(1),1:L and ∆
(V )
(1),1:L are sent to the outer-layer associated to
Receiver 1, while ∆(V )(2),1:L is sent to the outer-layer associated to Receiver 2.
Algorithm 2 Function form2_AG to achieve (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ⊆ R(k)MI-WTBC
Require: i, S(V )(k),i, Θ
(V )
i+1, Γ
(V )
i+1, Ψ
(V )
i−1, Γ
(V )
i−1, Π
(V )
(2),i−1, Λ
(V )
i−1; secret-keys κ
(V )
Θ , κ
(V )
Ψ and κ
(V )
Γ
1 Define R(n)1 , R′(n)1 , R(n)2 , R′(n)2 , R(n)1,2 , R′(n)1,2 , I(n), R(n)S , R(n)Λ
2 if i = 1 then A˜1[I(n) ∪ G(n)1 ∪ G(n)1,2 ]← S(V )(k),1
3 if i ∈ [2, L− 1] then A˜i[I(n)]← S(V )(k),i
4 if i = L then A˜L[I(n) ∪ G(n)2 ]← S(V )(k),L
5 Ψ¯
(V )
i−1 ← Ψ(V )i−1 ⊕ κ(V )Ψ and Γ¯(V )i−1 ← Γ(V )i−1 ⊕ κ(V )Γ
6 Θ¯
(V )
i+1 ← Θ(V )i+1 ⊕ κ(V )Θ and Γ¯(V )i+1 ← Γ(V )i+1 ⊕ κ(V )Γ
7 if k = 1 then A˜i[R(n)1,2 ]← Γ(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ¯(V )1,i+1 else A˜i[R(n)1,2 ]← Γ¯(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ(V )1,i+1
8 if k = 1 then A˜i[R′(n)1,2 ]← Ψ(V )2,i−1 ⊕ Θ¯(V )2,i+1 else A˜i[R′(n)1,2 ]← Ψ¯(V )2,i−1 ⊕Θ(V )2,i+1
9 if i ∈ [1, L− 1] then
10 if k = 1 then A˜i[R(n)1 ]← Θ¯(V )1,i+1 else A˜i[R(n)1 ]← Θ(V )1,i+1
11 if k = 1 then A˜i[R′(n)1 ]← Γ¯(V )2,i+1 else A˜i[R′(n)1 ]← Γ(V )2,i+1
12 end if
13 if i ∈ [2, L] then
14 if k = 1 then A˜i[R(n)2 ]← Ψ(V )1,i−1 else A˜i[R(n)2 ]← Ψ¯(V )1,i−1
15 if k = 1 then A˜i[R′(n)2 ]← Γ(V )2,i−1 else A˜i[R′(n)2 ]← Γ¯(V )2,i−1
16 A˜i[R(n)S ]← Π(V )(2),i−1
17 A˜i[R(n)Λ ]← Λ(V )i−1
18 end if
19 Π
(V )
(1),i ← A˜i[I(n) ∩ G
(n)
1 ] and Π
(V )
(2),i ← A˜i[I(n) ∩ G
(n)
2 ]
20 Λ
(V )
i ← A˜i[R(n)Λ ]
21 if k = 1 then ∆(V )(1),i ←
(
Θ¯
(V )
3,i , Γ¯
(V )
3,i
)
else ∆(V )(1),i ←
(
Θ
(V )
3,i ,Γ
(V )
3,i
)
22 if k = 1 then ∆(V )(2),i ←
(
Ψ
(V )
3,i ,Γ
(V )
3,i
)
else ∆(V )(2),i ←
(
Ψ¯
(V )
3,i , Γ¯
(V )
3,i
)
23 return A˜i
[G(n)], Π(V )(1),i, Π(V )(2),i, Λ(V )i , ∆(V )(1),i and ∆(V )(2),i
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Case A when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2))
In Case A, we have |G(n)1 | > |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | > |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | ≥ |C(n)1,2 |.
1) Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this case, the construction of A˜1:L
[G(n)]
is the same as the one in [1] (Section IV.B.1, Case A). Hence, define
R(n)1 , any subset of G(n)2 with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣,
R(n)2 , any subset of G(n)1 with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣,
R(n)1,2 , any subset of G(n)0 with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣,
and R′(n)1 = R′(n)2 = R′(n)1,2 , ∅. Therefore, according to (30)–(32), we have
R(n)S = any subset of G(n)1 \ R(n)2 with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣,
I(n) = (G(n)0 ∪ G(n)2 ) \ (R(n)1 ∪R(n)1,2),
R(n)Λ = G(n)1,2 ∪
(G(n)1 \ (R(n)2 ∪R(n)S )).
From condition (27), all previous sets exist. Also, for i ∈ [1, L], define Ψ(V )1,i , Ψ(V )i , Γ(V )1,i , Γ(V )i ,
Θ¯
(V )
1,i , Θ¯
(V )
i , Γ¯
(V )
1,i , Γ¯
(V )
i and Ψ
(V )
p,i = Γ
(V )
p,i = Θ¯
(V )
p,i = Γ¯
(V )
p,i , ∅, where p ∈ [2, 3]. Then,
according to (36)–(39), for i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ] with size ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣,
Π
(V )
(1),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] = ∅, and ∆(V )(1),i = ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
According to Algorithm 2, recall that, for i ∈ [2, L], the chaining construction repeats Ψ(V )i−1 and Γ(V )i−1
entirely in A˜i
[R(n)2 ] ⊆ A˜i[G(n)1 ] and A˜i[R(n)1,2 ] ⊆ A˜i[G(n)0 ] respectively. Also, for i ∈ [1, L− 1], it
repeats the sequences Θ¯(V )i+1 and Γ¯
(V )
i+1 in A˜i
[R(n)1 ] ⊆ A˜i[G(n)2 ] and A˜i[G(n)0 ] respectively. Indeed,
for i ∈ [2, L − 1], recall that the encoder stores Γ(V )i−1 ⊕ Γ¯(V )i+1 in A˜i
[R(n)1,2 ]. The inner-layer carries
confidential information S(V )(1),1:L intended for Receiver 1, and for i ∈ [2, L] the encoder repeats
Π
(V )
(2),i−1 in A˜i[R
(n)
S ]. Finally, for i ∈ [2, L], it repeats Λ(V )i−1 in A˜i[R(n)Λ ] and, therefore, notice that
Λ
(V )
1 is replicated in all blocks. This particular encoding procedure is graphically represented in
[1] (Figure 3).
2) Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC. Define R(n)1 , R(n)2 , R(n)1,2 , R′(n)1 , R′(n)2 and
R′(n)1,2 as for the previous corner point. According to (30), (33) and (34):
R(n)S = any subset of G(n)1 \ R(n)2 with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣,
I(n) = (G(n)0 ∪ G(n)1 ∪ G(n)2 ) \ (R(n)1 ∪R(n)2 ∪R(n)1,2 ∪R(n)S ),
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R(n)Λ = G(n)1,2 .
Also, for i ∈ [1, L], we define Ψ¯(V )1,i , Ψ¯(V )i , Γ¯(V )1,i , Γ¯(V )i , Θ(V )1,i , Θ(V )i , Γ(V )1,i , Γ(V )i and,
therefore, Ψ¯(V )p,i = Γ¯
(V )
p,i = Θ
(V )
p,i = Γ
(V )
p,i , ∅, where p ∈ [2, 3]. Then, according to (36)–(39), for
i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩G(n)2 ] with size ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣, Π(V )(1),i = A˜i[I(n) ∩G(n)1 ] with
size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− (∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣), and ∆(V )(1),i = ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
According to Algorithm 2, now the inner-layer carries confidential information S(V )(2),1:L intended for
Receiver 2. Indeed, for i ∈ [1, L], A˜i
[G(n)1 \ (R(n)2 ∪ R(n)S )], which previously contained part of
Λ
(V )
i , now store part of S
(V )
(2),i. As before, for i ∈ [2, L], Π
(V )
(2),i−1 is repeated in A˜i[R
(n)
S ] and Λ
(V )
i−1
in A˜i[R(n)Λ ]. Now, as will be seen in Section IV-B, for i ∈ [1, L − 1] the sequence Π(V )(1),i+1 will
be repeated in the outer-layer T˜(1),i associated to Receiver 1. This particular encoding procedure is
graphically represented in Figure 2.
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Fig. 2. Case A when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)): inner-layer encoding to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC that
leads to the construction of A˜1:L[H(n)V ] when L = 3. Consider Block 2: the sets R(n)1 , R(n)2 , R(n)1,2 , R(n)S and R(n)Λ are those
areas filled with yellow squares, blue circles, blue and yellow diamonds, pink crosses, and gray pentagons, respectively; and I(n)
is the green filled area. At Block i ∈ [1, L], W (V )(2),i is represented by symbols of the same color (e.g., red symbols at Block 2),
and Θ(V )i , Ψ
(V )
i and Γ
(V )
i are represented by squares, circles and triangles respectively. Also, Ψ¯
(V )
i and Γ¯
(V )
i are denoted by
circles and triangles, respectively, with a line through them. At Block i ∈ [2, L − 1], the diamonds denote Γ¯(V )i−1 ⊕ Γ(V )i+1. In
Block i ∈ [1, L], S(V )(2),i is stored into those entries whose indices belong to the green filled area. For i ∈ [2, L], Π(V )(2),i−1 is
denoted by crosses (e.g., purple crosses at Block 2), and is repeated in A˜i[R(n)S ]. For i ∈ [1, L− 1], the sequence Π(V )(1),i+1 is
denoted by hexagons, and it will be send to the outer-layer T˜(1),i associated to Receiver 1. At Block 1, Λ
(V )
1 is denoted by gray
pentagons, and is repeated in all blocks. Finally, Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are those entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and the blue
curve at Block L, respectively.
Case B when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2))
In Case B, we have |G(n)1 | > |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | > |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | < |C(n)1,2 |.
1) Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this case, the construction of A˜1:L
[G(n)]
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is the same as the one described in [1] (Section IV.B.2, Case B). Now, since
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣, only
a part of Γ(V )i−1 (i ∈ [2, L]) and Γ¯(V )i+1 (i ∈ [1, L− 1]) can be repeated in A˜i
[G(n)0 ]. Thus, define
R(n)1 , any subset of G(n)2 with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣,
R(n)2 , any subset of G(n)1 with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣,
R(n)1,2 , G(n)0 ,
R′(n)1 , any subset of G(n)2 \ R(n)1 with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣,
R′(n)2 , any subset of G(n)1 \ R(n)2 with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣,
and R′(n)1,2 , ∅. Therefore, according to (30)–(32), we have
R(n)S = any subset of G(n)1 \
(R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 )
with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣),
I(n) = G(n)2 \
(R(n)1 ∪R′(n)1 ),
R(n)Λ , G(n)1,2 ∪
(G(n)1 \ (R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 ∪R(n)S )).
From (27), all previous sets exist. For i ∈ [1, L], we define Ψ(V )1,i , Ψ(V )i , Θ¯(V )1,i , Θ¯(V )i and Ψ(V )p,i =
Θ¯
(V )
p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]; and Γ(V )1,i and Γ¯(V )1,i as any part of Γ(V )i and Γ¯(V )i , respectively, with size∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ(V )2,i and Γ¯(V )2,i as the remaining parts with size ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, and Γ(V )3,i = Γ¯(V )3,i , ∅. From
(36)–(39), for i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i
[I(n)∩G(n)2 ] with size ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣−(∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣−∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣),
Π
(V )
(1),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] = ∅, and we have ∆(V )(1),i = ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
According to Algorithm 2, for i ∈ [1, L], Γ(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ¯(V )1,i+1 is repeated in A˜i
[R(n)1,2 ], where Γ(V )1,0 =
Γ¯
(V )
1,L = ∅. On the other hand, now Γ
(V )
2,i−1 (i ∈ [2, L]) and Γ¯(V )2,i+1 (i ∈ [1, L − 1]) are repeated
in A˜i
[R′(n)2 ] and A˜i[R′(n)1 ] respectively. The inner-layer carries confidential information S(V )(1),1:L
intended for Receiver 1, and for i ∈ [2, L] the encoder repeats Π(V )(2),i−1 in A˜i[R
(n)
S ]. Indeed, since
I(n) ⊆ G(n)2 , we have Π(V )(2),i = S
(V )
(1),i for i ∈ [1, L]. Finally, for i ∈ [2, L], the encoder repeats
Λ
(V )
i−1 in A˜i[R(n)Λ ] and, hence, Λ(V )1 is replicated in all blocks. This particular encoding procedure is
graphically represented in [1] (Figure 4).
2) Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC. Define R(n)1 , R(n)2 , R(n)1,2 , R′(n)2 and R′(n)1,2
as for the previous corner point, and R′(n)1 , ∅. From (30), (33) and (34):
R(n)S = any subset of G(n)1 \
(R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 ) with size ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣,
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I(n) = (G(n)1 ∪ G(n)2 ) \ (R(n)1 ∪R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 ∪R(n)S ),
R(n)Λ = G(n)1,2 .
For i ∈ [1, L], define Ψ¯(V )1,i , Ψ¯(V )i , Θ(V )1,i , Θ(V )i and Ψ¯(V )p,i = Θ(V )p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]. Also, we
define Γ¯(V )1,i as any part of Γ¯
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ¯(V )2,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣,
and Γ(V )3,i , ∅. On the other hand, now we define Γ
(V )
1,i as any part of Γ
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣,
Γ
(V )
2,i , ∅ and Γ
(V )
3,i as the remaining part with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. According to (36)–(39), for
i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ] with size ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣), sequence
Π
(V )
(1),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] with size ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ − (∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣), ∆(V )(1),i = Γ(V )3,i with size∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ and ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
According to Algorithm 2, the inner-layer carries confidential information S(V )(2),1:L intended for
Receiver 2. For i ∈ [2, L], Π(V )(2),i−1 is repeated in A˜i[R
(n)
S ] and Λ
(V )
i−1 in A˜i[R(n)Λ ]. Now, for i ∈
[1, L− 1] both Π(V )(1),i+1 and ∆
(V )
(1),i+1 will be repeated in outer-layer T˜(1),i associated to Receiver 1.
This particular encoding is represented in Figure 3.
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Fig. 3. Case B when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)): inner-layer encoding to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC that
leads to the construction of A˜1:L[H(n)V ] when L = 3. Consider Block 2: the sets R(n)1 , R(n)2 , R′(n)2 , R(n)1,2 , R(n)S and R(n)Λ are
those areas filled with yellow squares, blue circles, blue triangles, blue and yellow diamonds, pink crosses, and gray pentagons,
respectively; and I(n) is the green filled area. At Block i ∈ [1, L], W (V )(2),i is represented by symbols of the same color (e.g.,
red symbols at Block 2), and Θ(V )i , Ψ
(V )
i and Γ
(V )
i are represented by squares, circles and triangles respectively. Also, Ψ¯
(V )
i
and Γ¯(V )i are denoted by circles and triangles, respectively, with a line through them. At Block i ∈ [2, L − 1], the diamonds
denote Γ¯(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ(V )1,i+1. For i ∈ [1, L− 1], the elements of Γ(V )i+1 that do not belong to Γ(V )1,i+1 are not repeated in A˜i[G(n)], but
∆
(V )
(1),i+1 = Γ
(V )
3,i+1 will be sent to the outer-layer T˜(1),i. In Block i ∈ [1, L], S(V )(2),i is stored into those entries whose indices
belong to the green filled area. For i ∈ [2, L], Π(V )(2),i−1 is denoted by crosses and is repeated in A˜i[R(n)S ]. For i ∈ [1, L−1], the
sequence Π(V )(1),i+1 is denoted by hexagons, and it will be send also to T˜(1),i. At Block 1, Λ
(V )
1 is denoted by gray pentagons
and is repeated in all blocks. Finally, Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are those entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and the blue curve at
Block L, respectively.
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Case B when I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2))
1) Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this situation, according to condi-
tion (28),
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. Therefore, for i ∈ [1, L − 1], sequence Γ¯(V )i+1 cannot
be repeated entirely in A˜i
[G(n)0 ∪ (G(n)2 \ R(n)1 )]. Thus, we define
R(n)1 , any subset of G(n)2 with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣,
R(n)2 , any subset of G(n)1 with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣,
R(n)1,2 , G(n)0 ,
R′(n)1 , G(n)2 \ R(n)1 ,
R′(n)2 , any subset of G(n)1 \ R(n)2 with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣,
and R′(n)1,2 , ∅. Therefore, according to (30)–(32), we have R(n)S = I(n) = ∅ and
R(n)Λ , G(n)1,2 ∪
(G(n)1 \ (R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 )).
For i ∈ [1, L], we define Ψ(V )1,i , Ψ(V )i , Θ¯(V )1,i , Θ¯(V )i and Ψ(V )p,i = Θ¯(V )p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]. Also,
we define Γ(V )1,i as any part of Γ
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ(V )2,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣−∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ and Γ(V )3,i , ∅; and Γ¯(V )1,i as any part of Γ¯(V )i with size ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ¯(V )2,i as any part of Γ¯(V )i
that is not included in Γ¯(V )1,i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣, and Γ¯(V )3,i as the remaining part of Γ¯(V )i
with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ − (∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣). Thus, according to (36)–(39), for i ∈ [1, L] we have
Π
(V )
(2),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ] = ∅, Π(V )(1),i = A˜i[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] = ∅, ∆(V )(1),i = Γ¯(V )3,i and ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
According to Algorithm 2, since I(n) = ∅ then A˜n2:L−1
[G(n)] does not carry confidential information
S
(V )
(1),2:L−1. For i ∈ [1, L−1], ∆
(V )
(1),i+1 will be repeated in outer-layer T˜
n
(1),i. This particular encoding
is graphically represented in Figure 4.
2) Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC. Construction of A˜1:L
[G(n)] is the same
as the one to achieve this rate tuple when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)).
Case B when I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z)
1) Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this situation, define
R(n)1 , any subset of G(n)2 with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣,
R(n)2 , any subset of G(n)1 with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣,
R(n)1,2 , G(n)0 ,
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Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Fig. 4. Case B when I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)): inner-layer encoding to achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC that
leads to the construction of A˜1:L[H(n)V ] when L = 3. Consider Block 2: the sets R(n)1 , R′(n)1 , R(n)2 , R′(n)2 , R(n)1,2 and R(n)Λ
are those areas filled with yellow squares, yellow triangles, blue circles, blue triangles, blue and yellow diamonds, and gray
pentagons, respectively. At Block i ∈ [1, L], W (V )(1),i is represented by symbols of the same color (e.g., red symbols at Block 2),
and Θ(V )i , Ψ
(V )
i and Γ
(V )
i are represented by squares, circles and triangles respectively. Also, Θ¯
(V )
i and Γ¯
(V )
i are denoted by
squares and triangles, respectively, with a line through them. At Block i ∈ [2, L − 1], the diamonds denote Γ(V )i−1 ⊕ Γ¯(V )i+1. For
i ∈ [2, L − 1], A˜i[G(n)] does not carry confidential information S(V )(1),i, but only A˜1[G(n)] and A˜L[G(n)] does (into the green
area). The elements of Γ¯(V )2,i+1 that do not fit in A˜i[R′(n)1 ] will be sent to outer-layer T˜n(1),i. At Block 1, Λ(V )1 is denoted by gray
pentagons, and is repeated in all blocks. Finally, sequences Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are those entries inside the red curve at Block 1
and the blue curve at Block L, respectively.
R′(n)1 , G(n)2 \ R(n)1 ,
R′(n)2 , G(n)1 \ R(n)2 ,
and R′(n)1,2 , ∅. Thus, according to (30)–(32), R(n)S = I(n) = ∅ and R(n)Λ = G(n)1,2 . In this situation
we have defined R′(n)1 and R′(n)2 as above because, according to condition (29),
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ <∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ and ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. Therefore, neither Γ(V )i−1 (for i ∈ [2, L]) nor Γ¯(V )i+1
(for i ∈ [1, L−1]) can be repeated entirely in A˜i
[G(n)0 ∪(G(n)1 \R(n)2 )] or A˜i[(G(n)0 ∪(G(n)2 \R(n)1 )],
respectively.
For i ∈ [1, L], we define Ψ(V )1,i , Ψ(V )i , Θ¯(V )1,i , Θ¯(V )i and Ψ(V )p,i = Θ¯(V )p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]; we define
Γ
(V )
1,i as any part of Γ
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ(V )2,i as any part of Γ(V )i that is not included in Γ(V )1,i with
size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣, and Γ(V )3,i as the remaining part of Γ(V )i with size ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣−∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣−(∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣);
and we define Γ¯(V )1,i as any part of Γ¯
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ¯(V )2,i as any part of Γ¯(V )i that is not included in
Γ¯
(V )
1,i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣, and Γ¯(V )3,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− (∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣). Hence, according to (36)–(39), for i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ] = ∅,
Π
(V )
(1),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] = ∅, and we have ∆(V )(1),i = Γ¯(V )3,i and ∆(V )(2),i = Γ(V )3,i . According to
Algorithm 2, since I(n) = ∅ then A˜n2:L−1
[G(n)] does not carry confidential information S(V )(1),2:L−1.
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For i ∈ [1, L− 1], ∆(V )(1),i+1 will be repeated in T˜n(1),i, while ∆
(V )
(2),i−1, for i ∈ [2, L], will be repeated
in T˜n(2),i. This particular encoding is represented in Figure 5.
2) Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC. Construction of A˜1:L
[G(n)] is almost the
same as that to achieve the previous corner point of region R(1)MI-WTBC: to approach this rate tuple
the encoder repeats
[
Ψ¯
(V )
i−1, Γ¯
(V )
i−1
]
and
[
Θ
(V )
i+1,Γ
(V )
i+1
]
in Block i.
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Fig. 5. Case B when I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z): inner-layer encoding to achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC that
leads to the construction of A˜1:L[H(n)V ] when L = 3. Consider Block 2: the sets R(n)1 , R′(n)1 , R(n)2 , R′(n)2 , R(n)1,2 and R(n)Λ
are those areas filled with yellow squares, yellow triangles, blue circles, blue triangles, blue and yellow diamonds, and gray
pentagons, respectively. At Block i ∈ [1, L], W (V )(1),i is represented by symbols of the same color (e.g., red symbols at Block 2),
and Θ(V )i , Ψ
(V )
i and Γ
(V )
i are represented by squares, circles and triangles respectively. Also, Θ¯
(V )
i and Γ¯
(V )
i are denoted by
squares and triangles, respectively, with a line through them. The diamonds at Block i ∈ [2, L− 1] denote Γ(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ¯(V )1,i+1. For
i ∈ [2, L − 1], A˜i[G(n)] does not carry confidential information S(V )(1),i, but only A˜1[G(n)] and A˜L[G(n)] does (into the green
area). The elements of Γ(V )i−1, or Γ¯
(V )
i+1, which do not fit in A˜i[R(n)1,2 ∪R′(n)2 ], or A˜i[R(n)1,2 ∪R′(n)1 ], will be sent to the outer-layer
T˜n(2),i, or T˜
n
(1),i, respectively. At Block 1, Λ
(V )
1 is denoted by gray pentagons and is replicated in all blocks. Finally, sequences
Υ
(V )
(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are those entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and the blue curve at Block L, respectively.
Case C when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2))
In Case C, we have |G(n)1 | ≥ |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | ≤ |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | > |C(n)1,2 |.
1) Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. The construction of A˜1:L
[G(n)] in this
case is the same as that in [1] (Section IV.3, Case C). Since
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣, now for i ∈ [1, L− 1]
we have that Θ¯(V )i+1 fills all the elements of A˜i
[G(n)2 ]. Therefore:
R(n)1,2 , any subset of G(n)0 with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣,
R(n)1 , the union of G(n)2 with any subset of G(n)0 \ R(n)1,2 with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣,
R(n)2 , any subset of G(n)1 with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣,
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and R′(n)1 = R′(n)2 = R′(n)1,2 , ∅. Hence, according to (30)–(32), we have R(n)S = ∅ and
I(n) = G(n)0 \ R(n)1,2 ,
R(n)Λ = G(n)1,2 ∪
(G(n)1 \ R(n)2 ).
From condition (27), all previous sets exist. For i ∈ [1, L], we define Ψ(V )1,i , Ψ(V )i , Γ(V )1,i , Γ(V )i ,
Θ¯
(V )
1,i , Θ¯
(V )
i , Γ¯
(V )
1,i , Γ¯
(V )
i , and Ψ
(V )
p,i = Γ
(V )
p,i = Θ¯
(V )
p,i = Γ¯
(V )
p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]. According to
(36)–(39), for i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ] = ∅, Π(V )(1),i = A˜i[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] = ∅,
and ∆(V )(1),i = ∆
(V )
(2),i = ∅. According to Algorithm 2, the inner-layer carries confidential information
S
(V )
(1),1:L intended for Receiver 1. For i ∈ [2, L], the encoder repeats Λ
(V )
i−1 in A˜i[R(n)Λ ] and, therefore,
Λ
(V )
1 is replicated in all blocks. This particular encoding procedure is represented in [1] (Figure 5).
2) Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC. Define R(n)2 , R(n)1,2 , R′(n)1 , R′(n)2 and R′(n)1,2
as for the previous corner point, and define R(n)1 , G(n)2 . Thus, according to (30), (33) and (34),
we have R(n)S = ∅ and
I(n) = (G(n)0 ∪ G(n)1 ) \ (R(n)2 ∪R(n)1,2),
R(n)Λ = G(n)1,2 .
For i ∈ [1, L], let Ψ¯(V )1,i , Ψ¯(V )i , Γ(V )1,i , Γ(V )i , Γ¯(V )1,i , Γ¯(V )i , and Ψ¯(V )p,i = Γ(V )p,i = Γ¯(V )p,i , ∅ for
p ∈ [2, 3]. Now, we define Θ(V )1,i as any part of Θ(V )i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣, Θ(V )2,i , ∅, and Θ(V )3,i as the
remaining part of Θ(V )i with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣. According to (36)–(39), for i ∈ [1, L] we have
Π
(V )
(2),i = A˜i
[I(n)∩G(n)2 ] = ∅, Π(V )(1),i = A˜i[I(n)∩G(n)1 ] with size ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣, ∆(V )(1),i = Θ(V )3,i , and
∆
(V )
(2),i = ∅. Now, the inner-layer carries confidential information S
(V )
(2),1:L intended for Receiver 2.
For i ∈ [1, L − 1], both ∆(V )(1),i+1 and Π
(V )
(1),i+1 will be repeated in outer-layer T˜
n
(1),i. This particular
encoding is represented in Figure 6.
Case C when I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2))
1) Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this situation, according to (28),
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. Hence, for i ∈ [1, L − 1], Θ¯(V )i+1 cannot be repeated entirely in A˜i[G(n)2 ∪(G(n)0 \ R(n)1,2)]. Therefore, define
R(n)1,2 , any subset of G(n)0 with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣,
R(n)1 , G(n)2 ∪
(G(n)0 \ R(n)1,2),
R(n)2 , any subset of G(n)1 with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣,
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and R′(n)1 = R′(n)2 = R′(n)1,2 , ∅. Then, according to (30)–(32), R(n)S = I(n) = ∅ and
R(n)Λ = G(n)1,2 ∪
(G(n)1 \ R(n)2 ).
For i ∈ [1, L], let Ψ(V )1,i , Ψ(V )i , Γ(V )1,i , Γ(V )i , Γ¯(V )1,i , Γ¯(V )i , and Ψ(V )p,i = Γ(V )p,i = Γ¯(V )p,i , ∅ for
p ∈ [2, 3]. Also, we define Θ¯(V )1,i as any part of Θ¯(V )i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣+ (∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣), Θ¯(V )2,i = ∅
and Θ¯(V )3,i as the remaining part with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣−(∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣). According to (36)–(39),
for i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ] = ∅, Π(V )(1),i = A˜i[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] = ∅, ∆(V )(1),i = Θ¯(V )3,i ,
and ∆(V )(2),i = ∅. Since I(n) = ∅ then A˜n2:L−1
[G(n)] does not carry confidential information S(V )(1),2:L−1.
For i ∈ [1, L− 1], sequence ∆(V )(1),i+1 will be repeated in outer-layer T˜n(1),i associated to Receiver 1.
2) Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC. Construction of A˜1:L
[G(n)] is the same
as that to achieve this rate tuple when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)).
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Fig. 6. Case C when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)): inner-layer encoding to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC that
leads to the construction of A˜1:L[H(n)V ] when L = 3. Consider the Block 2: R(n)1 , R(n)2 , R(n)1,2 and R(n)Λ are those areas filled
with yellow squares, blue circles, blue and yellow diamonds, and gray pentagons, respectively, and I(n) is the green filled area.
At Block i ∈ [1, L], W (V )(2),i is represented by symbols of the same color (e.g., red symbols at Block 2), and Θ(V )i , Ψ(V )i and
Γ
(V )
i are represented by squares, circles and triangles respectively. Also, Ψ¯
(V )
i and Γ¯
(V )
i are denoted by circles and triangles,
respectively, with a line through them. At Block i ∈ [2, L − 1], the diamonds denote Γ¯(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ(V )1,i+1. For i ∈ [1, L − 1],
the elements of Θ(V )i+1 that do not belong to Θ
(V )
1,i+1 are not repeated in A˜i[G(n)], but ∆(V )(1),i+1 = Θ(V )3,i+1 will be sent to the
outer-layer T˜(1),i. For i ∈ [1, L], confidential information S(V )(2),i is stored into those entries belonging to the green area. For
i ∈ [1, L − 1], sequence Π(V )(1),i+1 is denoted by hexagons, and it will be send also to T˜(1),i. At Block 1, Λ(V )1 is denoted by
gray pentagons and is replicated in all blocks. Finally, Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are those entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and the
blue curve at Block L, respectively.
Case D when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2))
In Case D, we have |G(n)1 | < |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | < |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | > |C(n)1,2 |.
1) Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this case, the construction of A˜1:L
[G(n)]
is the same as the one described in [1] (Section IV.4, Case D). Since |G(n)1 | < |C(n)2 |, now for i ∈ [2, L]
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only a part of Ψ(V )i−1 can be repeated entirely in A˜i[G(n)1 ]. Consequently, we define R(n)2 , G(n)1 ,
R(n)1,2 , any subset of G(n)0 with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣,
R′(n)1,2 , any subset of G(n)0 \ R(n)1,2 with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣,
R(n)1 , the union of G(n)2 with any subset of
G(n)0 \
(R(n)1,2 ∪R′(n)1,2 ) with size ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣);
and R′(n)1 = R′(n)2 , ∅. Hence, according to (30)–(32), we have R(n)S = ∅ and
I(n) = G(n)0 \
(R(n)1,2 ∪R′(n)1,2 ),
R(n)Λ = G(n)1,2 .
From condition (27), all previous sets exist. For i ∈ [1, L], let Γ(V )1,i , Γ(V )i , Γ¯(V )1,i , Γ¯(V )i and
Γ¯
(V )
p,i = Γ
(V )
p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]. On the other hand, define Ψ(V )1,i as any part Ψ(V )i with size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣,
Ψ
(V )
2,i as the remaining part with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, and Ψ(V )3,i , ∅; and Θ¯(V )1,i as any part of
Θ¯
(V )
i with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − (∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣), Θ¯(V )2,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣,
and Θ¯(V )3,i , ∅. Thus, from (36)–(39), for i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ] = ∅,
Π
(V )
(1),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] = ∅, and ∆(V )(1),i = ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
According to Algorithm 2, the inner-layer carries confidential information S(V )(1),1:L intended for
Receiver 1. Also, instead of repeating Ψ(V )2,i−1 (the part of Ψ
(V )
i−1 that does not fit in A˜
n
i
[G(n)1 ]) in
a specific part of A˜i
[G(n)0 ], the encoder stores Ψ(V )2,i−1 ⊕ Θ¯(V )2,i+1 into A˜i[R′(n)1,2 ] ⊆ A˜i[G(n)0 ], where
Θ¯
(V )
2,i+1 denotes the elements of Θ¯
(V )
i+1 that do not fit in A˜i
[G(n)2 ]. Finally, for i ∈ [2, L], Λ(V )i−1
is repeated in A˜i[R(n)Λ ] and, hence, Λ(V )1 is replicated in all blocks. This particular encoding is
graphically represented in [1] (Figure 5).
2) Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC. Define R(n)2 , R(n)1,2 , R′(n)1 , R′(n)2 and R′(n)1,2
as for the previous corner point, and define R(n)1 , G(n)2 . Thus, according to (30), (33) and (34),
we have R(n)S = ∅ and
I(n) = G(n)0 \
(R(n)1,2 ∪R′(n)1,2 ),
R(n)Λ = G(n)1,2 .
For i ∈ [1, L], let Γ(V )1,i , Γ(V )i , Γ¯(V )1,i , Γ¯(V )i and Γ¯(V )p,i = Γ(V )p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]; and define
Ψ¯
(V )
1,i as any part Ψ¯
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, Ψ¯(V )2,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, and
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Ψ¯
(V )
3,i , ∅. On the other hand, define Θ
(V )
1,i as any part of Θ
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣, Θ(V )2,i as any
part of Θ(V )i that is not included in Θ
(V )
1,i with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, and Θ(V )3,i as the remaining
part of Θ(V )i with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − (∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣). Therefore, according to (36)–(39), for
i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩G(n)2 ] = ∅, Π(V )(1),i = A˜i[I(n) ∩G(n)1 ] = ∅, ∆(V )(1),i = Θ(V )3,i , and
∆
(V )
(2),i = ∅. Now, the inner-layer carries confidential information S
(V )
(2),1:L intended for Receiver 2.
For i ∈ [1, L− 1], sequence ∆(V )(1),i+1 will be repeated in outer-layer T˜n(1),i. This particular encoding
procedure is graphically represented in Figure 7.
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Fig. 7. Case D when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)): inner-layer encoding to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC that
leads to the construction of A˜1:L[H(n)V ] when L = 3. Consider Block 2: R(n)1 , R(n)2 , R(n)1,2 , R′(n)1,2 and R(n)Λ are those areas filled
with yellow squares, blue circles, blue and yellow diamonds, yellow squares overlapped by blue circles, and gray pentagons,
respectively, and I(n) is the green filled area. At Block i ∈ [1, L], W (V )(2),i is represented by symbols of the same color, and Θ(V )i ,
Ψ
(V )
i and Γ
(V )
i are represented by squares, circles and triangles respectively. Also, Ψ¯
(V )
i and Γ¯
(V )
i are denoted by circles and
triangles, respectively, with a line through them. At Block i ∈ [2, L−1], the diamonds denote Γ¯(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ(V )1,i+1, while the yellow
squares overlapped by blue circles denote Ψ¯(V )2,i−1 ⊕Θ(V )2,i+1. For i ∈ [1, L− 1], the elements of Θ(V )i+1 that are included neither
in Θ(V )1,i+1 nor Θ
(V )
2,i+1 are not repeated in A˜i[G(n)], but ∆(V )(1),i+1 = Θ(V )3,i+1 will be sent to outer-layer T˜(1),i. For i ∈ [1, L],
S
(V )
(2),i is stored into those entries belonging to the green area. At Block 1, sequence Λ
(V )
1 is denoted by gray pentagons and
is replicated in all blocks. Finally, Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are those entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and the blue curve at
Block L, respectively.
Case D when I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2))
1) Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this situation, according to (28), we
have
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. Hence, for i ∈ [1, L− 1], Θ¯(V )i+1 cannot be repeated entirely
in A˜i
[G(n)2 ∪ (G(n)0 \ R(n)1,2)]. Therefore, define R(n)2 , G(n)1 ,
R(n)1,2 , any subset of G(n)0 with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣,
R′(n)1,2 , any subset of G(n)0 \ R(n)1,2 with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣,
R(n)1 , G(n)2 ∪
(G(n)0 \ (R(n)1,2 ∪R′(n)1,2 )),
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and R′(n)1 = R′(n)2 , ∅. Then, from (30)–(32), R(n)S = I(n) = ∅ and R(n)Λ = G(n)1,2 . For i ∈ [1, L], let
Γ
(V )
1,i , Γ
(V )
i , Γ¯
(V )
1,i , Γ¯
(V )
i and Γ¯
(V )
p,i = Γ
(V )
p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]; and define Ψ(V )1,i as any part Ψ(V )i
with size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, Ψ(V )2,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, and Ψ(V )3,i , ∅. On the other
hand, we define Θ¯(V )1,i as any part of Θ¯
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ + ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − (∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ + ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣),
Θ¯
(V )
2,i as any part of Θ¯
(V )
i that is not included in Θ¯
(V )
1,i with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, and Θ¯(V )3,i as the
remaining part with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣−(∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣). According to (36)–(39), for i ∈ [1, L] we
have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ] = ∅, Π(V )(1),i = A˜i[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] = ∅, ∆(V )(1),i = Θ¯(V )3,i , and ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
Since I(n) = ∅, A˜n2:L−1
[G(n)] does not carry confidential information S(V )(1),2:L−1. For i ∈ [1, L− 1],
sequence ∆(V )(1),i+1 will be repeated in outer-layer T˜
n
(1),i.
2) Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC. Construction of A˜1:L
[G(n)] is the same
as that to achieve this rate tuple when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)).
Case D when I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z)
1) Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this situation, from (29), we have∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ and ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣. Therefore:
R(n)1,2 , any subset of G(n)0 with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣,
R′(n)1,2 , G(n)0 \ R(n)1,2 ,
R(n)1 , G(n)2 , R(n)2 , G(n)1 and R′(n)1 = R′(n)2 , ∅. Then, from (30)–(32), we have R(n)S = I(n) = ∅
and R(n)Λ = G(n)1,2 . For i ∈ [1, L], let Γ(V )1,i , Γ(V )i , Γ¯(V )1,i , Γ¯(V )i and Γ¯(V )p,i = Γ(V )p,i , ∅ for
p ∈ [2, 3]. Also, we define Θ¯(V )1,i as any part of Θ¯(V )i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣, Θ¯(V )2,i as any part of Θ¯(V )i
that is not included in Θ¯(V )1,i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣, and Θ¯(V )3,i as the remaining part of Θ¯(V )i with
size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − (∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣). On the other hand, define Ψ(V )1,i as any part of Ψ(V )i with
size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, Ψ(V )2,i as any part of Ψ(V )i that is not included in Ψ(V )1,i with size ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣, and
Ψ
(V )
3,i as the remaining part with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ − (∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣). According to (36)–(39),
for i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ] = ∅, Π(V )(1),i = A˜i[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] = ∅, ∆(V )(1),i = Θ¯(V )3,i ,
and ∆(V )(2),i = Ψ
(V )
3,i . The sequence ∆
(V )
(1),i+1 (i ∈ [1, L− 1]) will be repeated in T˜n(1),i, while ∆
(V )
(2),i−1
(i ∈ [2, L]) will be stored in T˜n(2),i. Since I(n) = ∅, then A˜n2:L−1
[G(n)] does not carry confidential
information. This particular encoding is represented in Figure 8.
2) Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC. Construction of A˜1:L
[G(n)] is almost the
same as that to achieve the previous corner point of region R(1)MI-WTBC: to approach this rate tuple
the encoder repeats
[
Ψ¯
(V )
i−1, Γ¯
(V )
i−1
]
and
[
Θ
(V )
i+1,Γ
(V )
i+1
]
in Block i.
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Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Fig. 8. Case D when I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z): inner-layer encoding to achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC that
leads to the construction of A˜1:L[H(n)V ] when L = 3. Consider Block 2: the sets R(n)1 , R(n)2 , R(n)1,2 , R′(n)1,2 and R(n)Λ are those
areas filled with yellow squares, blue circles, blue and yellow diamonds, yellow squares overlapped by blue circles, and gray
pentagons, respectively. At Block i ∈ [1, L], W (V )(1),i is represented by symbols of the same color (red symbols at Block 2),
and Θ(V )i , Ψ
(V )
i and Γ
(V )
i are represented by squares, circles and triangles respectively. Also, Θ¯
(V )
i and Γ¯
(V )
i are denoted by
squares and triangles, respectively, with a line through them. The diamonds at Block i ∈ [2, L− 1] represent Γ(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ¯(V )1,i+1,
while the squares overlapped by circles denote Ψ(V )2,i−1 ⊕ Θ¯(V )2,i+1. For i ∈ [2, L − 1], A˜i[G(n)] does not carry confidential
information S(V )(1),i, but only A˜1[G(n)] and A˜L[G(n)] does (into the green area). The elements of Ψ(V )i−1, or Θ¯(V )i+1, which do not
fit in A˜i[R′(n)1,2 ∪R(n)2 ], or A˜i[R′(n)1,2 ∪R(n)1 ], will be sent to T˜n(2),i, or T˜n(1),i, respectively. At Block 1, Λ(V )1 is denoted by gray
pentagons and is repeated in all blocks. Finally, sequences Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are those entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and
the blue curve at Block L, respectively.
Case E when I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2))
In Case E, we have |G(n)1 | > |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | < |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | < |C(n)1,2 |.
1) Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this case, we define
R(n)1 , G(n)2 ,
R(n)2 , any subset of G(n)1 with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣,
R(n)1,2 , G(n)0 ,
R′(n)2 , any subset of G(n)1 \ R(n)2 with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣,
and R′(n)1 = R′(n)1,2 , ∅. Then, from (30)–(32), we have R(n)S = I(n) = ∅ and
R(n)Λ = G(n)1,2 ∪
(G(n)1 \ R(n)2 ).
From condition (28), all previous sets exist. For i ∈ [1, L], we define Ψ(V )1,i , Ψ(V )i and Ψ(V )p,i , ∅
for p ∈ [2, 3]. Also, we define Θ¯(V )1,i as any part of Θ¯(V )i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣, Θ¯(V )2,i , ∅, and Θ¯(V )3,i as
the remaining part with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣. We define Γ(V )1,i as any part of Γ(V )i with size ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣,
Γ
(V )
2,i as the remaining part with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, and Γ(V )3,i , ∅. Finally, Γ¯(V )1,i is defined as
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any part of Γ¯(V )i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ¯(V )2,i , ∅, and Γ¯(V )3,i as the remaining part of Γ¯(V )i with size∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. According to (36)–(39), for i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ] = ∅,
Π
(V )
(1),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩G(n)1 ] = ∅, ∆(V )(1),i = [Θ¯(V )3,i , Γ¯(V )3,i ] with size ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, and
∆
(V )
(2),i = ∅. Since I(n) = ∅, A˜n2:L−1
[G(n)] does not carry confidential information S(V )(1),2:L−1. For
i ∈ [1, L− 1], sequence ∆(V )(1),i+1 will be repeated in outer-layer T˜n(1),i.
2) Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC. Construction of A˜1:L
[G(n)] is similar to
the previous one to achieve the previous corner point of region R(1)MI-WTBC. We define R(n)1 , R(n)2 ,
R(n)1,2 , R′(n)1 , R′(n)2 and R′(n)1,2 as for the previous corner point. Thus, according to (30), (33) and
(34), we have R(n)S = ∅ and
I(n) = G(n)1 \
(R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 ),
R(n)Λ = G(n)1,2 .
Now, for i ∈ [1, L] we define Ψ¯(V )1,i , Ψ¯(V )i and Ψ¯(V )p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]. Also, Θ(V )1,i is de-
fined as any part of Θ(V )i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣, Θ(V )2,i , ∅, and Θ(V )3,i as the remaining part with
size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣. We define Γ¯(V )1,i as any part of Γ¯(V )i with size ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ¯(V )2,i as the remain-
ing part with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, and Γ¯(V )3,i , ∅. Finally, we define Γ(V )1,i as any part of Γ(V )i
with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ¯(V )2,i , ∅, and Γ(V )3,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. From
(36)–(39), for i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ] = ∅, Π(V )(1),i = A˜i[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] with size∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣), ∆(V )(2),i = ∅ and the sequence ∆(V )(1),i = [Θ(V )3,i ,Γ(V )3,i ] with size∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. According to Algorithm 2, now A˜n1:L[G(n)] carries confidential
information S(V )(2),1:L. For i ∈ [1, L− 1], ∆
(V )
(1),i+1 will be repeated in T˜
n
(1),i.
Case E when I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z)
1) Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. According to condition (29), now we have∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ and ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. Now, all the elements of
Γ
(V )
i−1, i ∈ [2, L], cannot be repeated in A˜i
[G(n)1 \ R(n)2 ] as before. Thus:
R(n)1 , G(n)2 ,
R(n)2 , any subset of G(n)1 with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣,
R(n)1,2 , G(n)0 ,
R′(n)2 , G(n)1 \ R(n)2 ,
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and R′(n)1 = R′(n)1,2 , ∅. Then, from (30)–(32), we have R(n)S = I(n) = ∅ and R(n)Λ = G(n)1,2 . For
i ∈ [1, L] we define Ψ(V )1,i , Ψ(V )i and Ψ(V )p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]. Also, Θ¯(V )1,i is defined as any part
of Θ¯(V )i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣, Θ¯(V )2,i , ∅, and Θ¯(V )3,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣. We
define Γ¯(V )1,i as any part of Γ¯
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ¯(V )2,i , ∅, and Γ¯(V )3,i as the remaining part with size∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. Finally, we define Γ(V )1,i as any part of Γ(V )i with size ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ(V )2,i as any part of Γ(V )i
that is not included in Γ(V )1,i with size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣, and Γ(V )3,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣−∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣−(∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣). According to (36)–(39), for i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i[I(n)∩G(n)2 ] =
∅, Π(V )(1),i= A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ]= ∅, ∆(V )(1),i = [Θ¯(V )3,i , Γ¯(V )3,i ] with size ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣,
and ∆(V )(2),i= Γ
(V )
3,i with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣. Since I(n) = ∅, A˜n2:L−1 does not carry
confidential information S(V )(1),2:L−1. Lastly, ∆
(V )
(1),i+1 (i ∈ [1, L − 1]) will be repeated in T˜n(1),i, and
∆
(V )
(2),i−1 (i ∈ [2, L]) will be repeated in T˜n(2),i.
2) Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC. Construction of A˜1:L
[G(n)] is exactly the
same as the one to achieve the previous corner point of region R(1)MI-WTBC.
Case F when I(V ;Y(1) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z)
In Case F, we have |G(n)1 | < |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | < |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | < |C(n)1,2 |.
1) Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this case, for i ∈ [2, L] the PCS can
repeat entirely neither Γ(V )i−1 in A˜i
[G(n)0 ] nor Ψ(V )i−1 in A˜i[G(n)1 ]. Also, for i ∈ [1, L − 1], it can
repeat entirely neither Γ¯(V )i+1 in A˜i
[G(n)0 ] nor Θ¯(V )i+1 in A˜i[G(n)2 ]. Thus, we define R(n)1,2 , G(n)0 ,
R(n)1 , G(n)2 , R(n)2 , G(n)1 , and R′(n)1 = R′(n)2 = R′(n)1,2 , ∅. For i ∈ [1, L], we define Ψ(V )1,i as any
part of Ψ(V )i with size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, Ψ(V )1,i , ∅, and Ψ(V )3,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣.
Also, we define Θ¯(V )1,i as any part of Θ¯
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣, Θ¯(V )2,i , ∅, and Θ¯(V )3,i as the remaining
part with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣. Finally, we define Γ(V )1,i and Γ¯(V )1,i as any part of Γ(V )i and Γ¯(V )i ,
respectively, with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ(V )2,i = Γ¯(V )2,i , ∅, and Γ(V )3,i and Γ¯(V )3,i as the remaining parts with
size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. According to (36)–(39), for i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = A˜i[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ] = ∅,
Π
(V )
(1),i= A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ]= ∅, ∆(V )(1),i= [Θ¯(V )3,i , Γ¯(V )3,i ] with size ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, and
∆
(V )
(2),i=
[
Ψ
(V )
3,i ,Γ
(V )
3,i
]
with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ + ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. Since I(n) = ∅, A˜n2:L−1 does not
carry confidential information S(V )(1),2:L−1. Lastly, ∆
(V )
(1),i+1 (i ∈ [1, L− 1]) will be repeated in T˜n(1),i,
and ∆(V )(2),i−1 (i ∈ [2, L]) will be repeated in T˜n(2),i.
2) Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC. Construction of A˜1:L
[G(n)] is almost the
same as that to achieve the previous corner point of region R(1)MI-WTBC: to approach this rate tuple
the encoder repeats
[
Ψ¯
(V )
i−1, Γ¯
(V )
i−1
]
and
[
Θ
(V )
i+1,Γ
(V )
i+1
]
in Block i.
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Summary of the construction of A˜1:L
[G(n)]
From (30)–(39); and from the definition of R(n)1 , R(n)2 , R(n)1,2 , R′(n)1 , R′(n)2 and R′(n)1,2 , and Ψ(V )p,i , Ψ¯(V )p,i ,
Γ
(V )
p,i , Γ¯
(V )
p,i , Θ
(V )
p,i and Θ¯
(V )
p,i for p ∈ [1, 3] and i ∈ [1, L] in each case, we have:
1) when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)),
• if the PCS operates to achieve (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC:
– the inner-layer carries S(V )(1),1:L, and
∣∣I(n)∣∣ = ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣;
– we have Π(V )(1),i = ∅ and ∆
(V )
(1),i = ∅;
– we have ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
• if the PCS operates to achieve (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC:
– the inner-layer carries S(V )(2),1:L, and
∣∣I(n)∣∣ = ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣;
– the overall size of
[
Π
(V )
(1),i,∆
(V )
(1),i
]
is
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣;
– we have ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
2) when I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)),
• if the PCS operates to achieve (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC:
– the inner-layer carries S(V )(1),1:L, but
∣∣I(n)∣∣ = 0;
– we have Π(V )(1),i = ∅, and the size of ∆
(V )
(1),i is
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣;
– we have ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
• if the PCS operates to achieve (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC:
– the inner-layer carries S(V )(2),1:L, and
∣∣I(n)∣∣ = ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣;
– the overall size of
[
Π
(V )
(1),i,∆
(V )
(1),i
]
is
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣;
– we have ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
3) when I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z),
• if the PCS operates to achieve (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC:
– the inner-layer carries S(V )(1),1:L, but
∣∣I(n)∣∣ = 0;
– we have Π(V )(1),i = ∅, and the size of ∆
(V )
(1),i is
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣;
– the length of ∆(V )(2),i is
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣.
• if the PCS operates to achieve (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC:
– the inner-layer carries S(V )(2),1:L, but
∣∣I(n)∣∣ = 0;
– we have Π(V )(1),i = ∅, and the size of ∆
(V )
(1),i is
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣;
– the length of ∆(V )(2),i is
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣.
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B. Construction of the outer-layers
Consider that the PCS must achieve (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
)⊆R(k)MI-WTBC, where k ∈ [1, 2]. In order
to achieve this corner point, for i ∈ [1, L] the PCS first constructs T˜n(k),i associated to Receiver k, and
then forms T˜n
(k¯),i
associated to Receiver k¯, where recall that k¯ = [1, 2] \ k.
1) New sets associated to Tn(k),1:L. The sets H
(n)
U(k)|V , L
(n)
U(k)|V , H
(n)
U(k)|V Z and L
(n)
U(k)|V Y(k) associated to
outer-layer Tn(k) = U
n
(k)Gn are defined as in (11)–(14). Besides the previous sets, define the following
partition of H(n)U(k)|V :
F (n)0 , H(n)U(k)|V Z ∩ L
(n)
U(k)|V Y(k) , (40)
F (n)k , H(n)U(k)|V Z \ L
(n)
U(k)|V Y(k) , (41)
J (n)0 , H(n)U(k)|V ∩
(H(n)U(k)|V Z)C ∩ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k) , (42)
J (n)k , H(n)U(k)|V ∩
(H(n)U(k)|V Z)C \ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k) . (43)
For i ∈ [1, L], T˜(k),i
[H(n)U(k)|V ] will be suitable for storing uniformly distributed random sequences that
are independent of V˜ ni , and T˜(k),i
[F (n)0 ∪F (n)k ] = T˜(k),i[H(n)U(k)|V Z] is suitable for storing information
to be secured from the eavesdropper. Moreover, T˜(k),i
[F (n)k ∪J (n)k ] = T˜(k),i[H(n)U(k)|V \L(n)U(k)|V Y(k)] is
the uniformly distributed part independent of V˜ ni that is needed by Receiver k to reliably reconstruct
T˜n(k),i from observations Y˜
n
(k),i and sequence V˜
n
i by performing SC decoding.
We consider that I(U(k);Y(k)|V ) ≥ I(U(k);Z|V ) (see Remark 8 and Remark 9). Therefore, besides
the partition defined in (40)–(43), we define
D(n)k , any subset of F (n)0 with size
∣∣J (n)k ∣∣, (44)
L(n)k , any subset of F (n)0 \ D(n)k with size
{∣∣C(n)k ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)k¯ ∣∣}+. (45)
The set D(n)k exists because we have∣∣F (n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣J (n)k ∣∣ = ∣∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z ∩ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣H(n)U(k)|V ∩ (H(n)U(k)|V Z)C \ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k)∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z ∩ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(H(n)U(k)|V Z)C \ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(L(n)U(k)|V Y(k))C∣∣∣ ≥ 0, (46)
where the positivity holds by assumption and from applying source polarization [8] because
1
n
(∣∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(L(n)U(k)|V Y(k))C∣∣∣) n→∞−−−→ H(U(k)|V Z)−H(U(k)|V Y(k)). (47)
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On the other hand, according to (27)–(29), if k= 1 and k¯ = 2 then L(n)k = ∅ in Situation 1, where
I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)); and L(n)k 6= ∅ in Situation 2, where I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤
I(V ;Y(2)), and Situation 3, where I(V ;Y(1))≤ I(V ;Y(2))< I(V ;Z). Otherwise, if k = 2 and k¯ = 1,
then we have L(n)k = ∅ in Situation 1 and Situation 2, while L(n)k 6= ∅ in Situation 3. In situations
where L(n)k 6= ∅, if we consider only input distributions that imply (R?kS(1) , R?kS(2) , R?kW(1) , R?kW(2)) ∈ R4+,
set L(n)k exists because for i ∈ [1, L] the entries A˜i(j) such that j ∈ F (n)0 \
(D(n)k ∪ J (n)k ) will
be intended for storing S(k), and the rate of S(k) carried in the inner-layer is is negligible (see
Section V-A).
2) New sets associated to Tn
(k¯),1:L
. Sets H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k) , L
(n)
U(k¯)|V U(k) , H
(n)
U(k¯)|V U(k)Z and L
(n)
U(k¯)|V Y(k) associated
to Tn
(k¯)
= Un
(k¯)
Gn are defined in (15)–(18). Besides the previous sets, define:
Q(n)0 , H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z ∩ L
(n)
U(k¯)|V Y(k¯) , (48)
Q(n)
k¯
, H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z \ L
(n)
U(k¯)|V Y(k¯) , (49)
B(n)0 , H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k) ∩
(H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z)C ∩ L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯) , (50)
B(n)
k¯
, H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k) ∩
(H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z)C \ L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯) . (51)
For i ∈ [1, L], the entries of T˜(k¯),i
[H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)] will be suitable for storing uniformly distributed
random sequences that are independent of (V˜ ni , U˜
n
(k),i), and T˜(k¯),i
[Q(n)0 ∪Q(n)k¯ ] will be suitable for
storing information to be secured from the eavesdropper. Also, the elements of T˜(k¯),i
[B(n)
k¯
∪ Q(n)
k¯
]
are required by Receiver k¯ to reliably construct the entire sequence T˜n
(k¯),i
from (V˜ ni , Y˜
n
(k¯),i
) by using
SC decoding. Additionally, define
O(n)
k¯
, any subset of Q(n)0 with size
∣∣∣(H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k))C ∩H(n)U(k¯)|V \ L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯)∣∣∣, (52)
N (n)
k¯
, any subset of Q(n)0 \ O(n)k¯ with size
∣∣B(n)
k¯
∣∣, (53)
and M(n)
k¯
, which is defined as follows. If k = 1 and k¯ = 2, then
M(n)2 , any subset of Q(n)0 \(O(n)2 ∪N (n)2 ) with size
{∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣}+. (54)
Consequently, M(n)2 6= ∅ only in Situation 3, where I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z). On the
other hand, if k = 2 and k¯ = 1, then
M(n)1 , any subset of Q(n)0 \ (O(n)1 ∪N (n)1 )
with size

∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ if I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)),∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ otherwise. (55)
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Recall that I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) in Situation 1, where I(V ;Z) < I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)), and in
Situation 2, where I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)).
If we consider only distributions implying (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ∈ R4+, then O(n)k¯ , N
(n)
k¯
and
M(n)
k¯
must exist because, for i ∈ [1, L], T˜(k¯),i
[Q(n)0 \ (O(n)k¯ ∪ N (n)k¯ ∪M(n)k¯ )] is the only part that
will be intended for storing confidential information S(k¯).
Construction of T˜n(1),1:L and T˜
n
(2),1:L for (R
?1
S(1)
,R?1S(2),R
?1
W(1)
,R?1W(2)) ∈R
(1)
MI-WTBC
In this case (k = 1 and k¯ = 2), given V˜ ni , for i ∈ [1, L] the encoder first constructs T˜n(1),i associated
to Receiver 1. Then, given V˜ ni and T˜
n
(1),i, it forms T˜
n
(2),i associated to Receiver 2.
1) Construction of T˜n(1),i. Associated to T˜
n
(1),i, we have defined the sets F
(n)
0 , F (n)1 , J (n)0 and J (n)1 as
in (40)–(43), and D(n)1 and L(n)1 as in (44) and (45) respectively.
For i ∈ [1, L], let W (U)(1),i be a uniformly distributed vector of length
∣∣J (n)0 ∪ J (n)1 ∣∣ that represents
part of the private message intended for Receiver 1. The encoder forms T˜(1),i
[J (n)0 ∪ J (n)1 ] by
simply storing W (U)(1),i. We define Θ
(U)
(1),i , T˜(1),i
[J (n)1 ], which is required by Receiver 1 to reliably
estimate T˜n(1),i. Hence, for i ∈ [1, L−1], sequence Θ
(U)
(1),i+1 is repeated in T˜(1),i
[D(n)1 ] ⊆ T˜(1),i[F (n)0 ].
This sequence is not repeated directly, but the encoder copies instead Θ¯(U)(1),i+1 that is obtained as
follows. Let κ(U)Θ be a uniformly distributed key with length
∣∣J (n)1 ∣∣ that is privately shared between
transmitter and Receiver 1. Then, for i ∈ [1, L], we obtain Θ¯(U)(1),i , Θ
(U)
(1),i ⊕ κ
(U)
Θ . Since κ
(U)
Θ is
reused in all blocks, it is clear that its size becomes negligible in terms of rate for L large enough.
For i ∈ [1, L], let S(U)(1),i be a uniformly distributed vector that represents part of the confidential
message intended for Receiver 1. At Block 1, S(U)(1),1 has size
∣∣(F (n)0 ∪F (n)1 ) \ (D(n)1 ∪L(n)1 )∣∣ and is
stored in T˜(1),1
[(F (n)0 ∪F (n)1 )\(D(n)1 ∪L(n)1 )]; for i ∈ [2, L−1], S(U)(1),i has size ∣∣F (n)0 \(D(n)1 ∪L(n)1 )∣∣
and is stored in T˜(1),i
[F (n)0 \ (D(n)1 ∪ L(n)1 )]; and at Block L, S(U)(1),L has size ∣∣F (n)0 ∣∣ and is stored
into T˜(1),L
[F (n)0 ]. Moreover, for i ∈ [1, L], we define Λ(U)(1),i , T˜(1),i[F (n)1 ]. For i ∈ [2, L], Λ(U)(1),i−1
is repeated in T˜(1),i
[F (n)1 ] and, therefore, Λ(U)(1),1, which contains part of S(U)(1),1, is replicated in all
blocks.
Furthermore, for i ∈ [1, L−1], the encoder repeats3 [Π(V )(1),i+1∆(V )(1),i+1], which contain part of A˜ni+1,
in T˜(1),i
[L(n)1 ]. According to the summary of the construction of A˜1:L[G(n)] in the last part of
Section IV-A, notice that the length of ∆(V )(1),i+1 is
∣∣L(n)1 ∣∣.
Then, for i ∈ [1, L], given T˜(1),i
[H(n)U(1)|V ] and V˜ ni the encoder forms the remaining entries of T˜n(1),i
by using SC encoding: deterministic SC encoding for the elements of T˜(1),i
[L(n)U(1)|V ] and random
3From Section IV-A, Πˆ(V )(1),1:L = ∅ when the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R
(1)
MI-WTBC.
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SC encoding for the entries of T˜(1),i
[(H(n)U(1)|V )C \ L(n)U(1)|V ].
For i ∈ [1, L], the encoder obtains Φ(U)(1),i , T˜(1),i
[(H(n)U(1)|V )C \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)]. Also, it obtains Υ(U)(1) ,
T˜(1),1
[H(n)U(1)|V \L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)] from Block 1. The transmitter additionally sends (Υ(U)(1) ,Φ(U)(1),1:L)⊕κ(U)ΥΦ(1)
to Receiver 1, where κ(U)ΥΦ(1) is a uniformly distributed key with size L
∣∣(H(n)U(1)|V )C \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)∣∣ +∣∣H(n)U(1)|V \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)∣∣ that is privately shared between transmitter and Receiver 1.
Figure 10 may graphically represent this construction of T˜n(1),1:L if we do the following substitutions:
F (n)0 ← Q(n)0 , F (n)1 ← Q(n)1 , J (n)0 ← B(n)0 , J (n)1 ← B(n)1 , D(n)1 ← N (n)1 , L(n)1 ←M(n)1 , ∅ ← O(n)1 ,(H(n)U(1)|V )C ← (H(n)U(1)|V U(2))C, O(U)(1),1:L ← ∅. Moreover, at Block i ∈ [1, L− 1], the encoder repeats
Θ
(U)
(1),i+1 ⊕ κ
(U)
Θ instead of Θ
(U)
(1),i+1.
2) Construction of T˜n(2),i. Associated to T˜
n
(2),i, we have defined the sets Q
(n)
0 , Q(n)2 , B(n)0 and B(n)2 as
in (48)–(51), and O(n)2 , N (n)2 and M(n)2 as in (52)–(54) respectively.
The construction of T˜n(2),1:L is graphically summarized in Figure 9. For i ∈ [1, L], let W
(U)
(2),i be
a uniformly distributed vector of length
∣∣B(n)0 ∪ B(n)2 ∣∣ that represents the entire private message
intended for Receiver 2. The encoder forms T˜(2),i
[B(n)0 ∪B(n)2 ] by simply storing W (U)(2),i. We define
Ψ
(U)
(2),i , T˜(2),i
[B(n)2 ], which is required by Receiver 2 to reliably estimate T˜n(2),i. Thus, for i ∈ [2, L],
Ψ
(U)
(2),i−1 is repeated in T˜(2),i
[N (n)2 ] ⊆ T˜(2),i[Q(n)0 ].
For i ∈ [1, L], let S(U)(2),i be a uniformly distributed vector that represents part of the confidential
message intended for legitimate Receiver 2. At Block 1, S(U)(2),1 has size
∣∣Q(n)0 ∪Q(n)2 ∣∣ and is stored
in T˜(2),1
[Q(n)0 ∪Q(n)2 ]; and for i ∈ [2, L], S(U)(2),i has size ∣∣Q(n)0 \(O(n)2 ∪N (n)2 ∪M(n)2 )∣∣ and is stored
in T˜(2),i
[Q(n)0 \ (O(n)2 ∪ N (n)2 ∪M(n)2 )]. Moreover, for i ∈ [1, L] we define Λ(U)(2),i , T˜(2),i[Q(n)2 ].
For i ∈ [2, L], Λ(U)(2),i−1 is repeated in T˜(2),i
[Q(n)2 ] and, hence, Λ(U)(2),1, which contains part of S(U)(2),1,
is replicated in all blocks.
Furthermore, for i ∈ [2, L] the encoder repeats ∆(V )(2),i−1, which recall that contains part of A˜ni−1,
in T˜(2),i
[M(n)2 ]. According to the summary of the construction of A˜1:L[G(n)] in the last part of
Section IV-A, the length of ∆(V )(2),i−1 matches with
∣∣M(n)2 ∣∣.
Then, for i ∈ [1, L], given T˜(2),i
[H(n)U(2)|V U(1)], V˜ ni and T˜n(1),i, the encoder forms the remaining entries
of T˜n(2),i by using SC encoding. Now, notice that T˜(2),i
[(H(n)U(2)|V U(1))C] must depend not only on
sequence V˜ ni , but also on sequence U˜
n
(1),i that was constructed before. Moreover, T˜(2),i
[L(n)U(2)|V U(1)]
is formed by performing deterministic SC encoding, while T˜(2),i
[(H(n)U(2)|V U(1))C \ L(n)U(2)|V U(1)] is
drawn randomly.
For i ∈ [1, L], we define sequences O(U)(2),i , T˜(2),i
[(H(n)U(2)|V U(1))C ∩ H(n)U(2)|V \ L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)] and
Φ
(U)
(2),i , T˜(2),i
[(H(n)U(2)|V )C \ L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)], where notice that [O(U)(2),i,Φ(U)(2),i] contains those entries of
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Fig. 9. Construction of outer-layer T˜(2),1:L associated to Receiver 2 when the PCS must aproach the corner point
(R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊆ R(1)MI-WTBC. For any Block i ∈ [1, L], blue and green colors are used to represent the elements
of T˜n(2),i that contain independent private and confidential information, respectively. For i ∈ [2, L], orange, brown, red-purple
and blue-purple colors represent those entries that contain information repeated from Block i − 1: T˜(2),i[M(n)2 ] (in orange)
repeats information from A˜ni−1, T˜(2),i[N (n)2 ] (in brown) repeats Ψ(U)(2),i−1, T˜(2),i[O(n)2 ] (in blue-purple) repeats O¯(U)(2),i−1, and
T˜(2),i[Q(n)2 ] (in red-purple) repeats Λ(U)(2),i−1. Finally, for i ∈ [1, L], T˜(2),i[(H(n)U(2)|V U(1))
C] (in red) is drawn by SC encoding.
T˜(2),i
[(H(n)U(2)|V U(1))C] that are needed by Receiver 2 to reliably estimate T˜n(2),i, that is, [O(U)(2),i,Φ(U)(2),i] =
T˜(2),i
[(H(n)U(2)|V U(1))C\L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)]. Let κ(U)O be a uniformly distributed key with size ∣∣(H(n)U(2)|V U(1))C∩
H(n)U(2)|V \ L
(n)
U(2)|V Y(2)
∣∣ that is privately-shared between transmitter and Receiver 2. For i ∈ [1, L],
we define O¯(U)(2),i , O
(U)
(2),i ⊕ κ
(U)
O . Since O
(U)
(2),i is required by Receiver 2 to estimate T˜
n
(2),i, for
i ∈ [2, L] the encoder repeats O¯(U)(2),i−1 in T˜(2),i
[O(n)2 ]. Notice that κ(U)O is reused in all blocks, so
it is clear that its size becomes negligible in terms of rate for L large enough. Furthermore, the
encoder obtains Υ(U)(2) , T˜(2),L
[H(n)U(2)|V \L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)] from Block L, and the transmitter additionally
sends
(
Υ
(U)
(2) ,Φ
(U)
(2),1:L
) ⊕ κ(U)ΥΦ(2) to Receiver 2, κ(U)ΥΦ(2) being a uniformly distributed key with size
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L
∣∣(H(n)U(2)|V )C \ L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(2)|V \ L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)∣∣ that is privately shared between transmitter and
Receiver 2.
Finally, for i ∈ [1, L], the encoder obtains X˜ni , f
(
V˜ ni , U˜
n
(1),i, U˜
n
(2),i
)
, where recall that f(·) may
be any deterministic one-to-one function. The transmitter sends X˜ni over the WTBC, which induces
the channel outputs (Y˜ n(1),i, Y˜
n
(2),i, Z˜
n
i ).
Remark 7. For i ∈ [2, L], notice that O(U)(2),i−1, which is not negligible in terms of rate, is almost
uniformly distributed and independent of V˜ ni−1, but is dependent on (V˜
n
i−1, T˜
n
(1),i−1). Since T˜(2),i
[O(n)2 ] ⊂
T˜(2),i
[Q(n)0 ] is suitable for storing sequences that are uniform and independent of (V˜ ni , T˜n(1),i), the secret-
key κ(U)O is used to ensure that O¯
(U)
(2),i−1 is totally random (see Section V-B).
Construction of T˜n(1),1:L and T˜
n
(2),1:L for (R
?2
S(1)
,R?2S(2),R
?2
W(1)
,R?2W(2)) ∈R
(2)
MI-WTBC
In this case (k = 2 and k¯ = 1), given V˜ ni , for i ∈ [1, L] the encoder first constructs T˜n(2),i associated
to Receiver 2. Then, given V˜ ni and T˜
n
(2),i, it forms T˜
n
(1),i associated to Receiver 1.
1) Construction of T˜n(2),i. Associated to T˜
n
(2),i, we have defined the sets F
(n)
0 , F (n)2 , J (n)0 and J (n)2 as
in (40)–(43), and D(n)2 and L(n)2 as in (44) and (45) respectively.
For i ∈ [1, L], let W (U)(2),i be a uniformly distributed vector of length
∣∣J (n)0 ∪J (n)2 ∣∣ that represents part
of the private message intended for Receiver 2. The encoder forms T˜(2),i
[J (n)0 ∪ J (n)2 ] by simply
storing W (U)(2),i. Then, now we define Ψ
(U)
(2),i , T˜(2),i
[J (n)2 ], which is required by Receiver 2 to reliably
estimate T˜n(2),i. Thus, for i ∈ [2, L], Ψ
(U)
(2),i−1 is repeated in T˜(2),i
[D(n)2 ] ⊆ T˜(2),i[F (n)0 ]. This sequence
is not repeated directly, but the encoder copies instead Ψ¯(U)(2),i−1 that is obtained as follows. Let κ
(U)
Ψ be
a uniformly distributed key with length
∣∣J (n)2 ∣∣. Then, for i ∈ [1, L], we obtain Ψ¯(U)(2),i , Ψ(U)(2),i⊕κ(U)Ψ .
Since κ(U)Ψ is reused in all blocks, its size is negligible in terms of rate for L large enough.
For i ∈ [1, L], let S(U)(2),i be a uniformly distributed vector that represents the confidential message
intended for Receiver 2. At Block 1, S(U)(2),1 has size
∣∣F (n)0 ∪F (n)2 ∣∣ and is stored in T˜(2),1[F (n)0 ∪F (n)2 ];
and for i ∈ [2, L], S(U)(2),i has size
∣∣F (n)0 \ (D2 ∪ L(n)2 )∣∣ and is stored into T˜(2),i[F (n)0 \ (D2 ∪ L(n)2 )].
Moreover, for i ∈ [1, L] we define Λ(U)(2),i , T˜(2),i
[F (n)2 ]. For i ∈ [2, L], Λ(U)(2),i−1 is repeated in
F˜(2),i
[F (n)2 ] and, therefore, Λ(U)(2),1, which contains part of the confidential message S(U)(2),1, is replicated
in all blocks.
Furthermore, for i ∈ [2, L], the encoder repeats ∆(V )(2),i−1, which recall that contains part of A˜ni−1,
in T˜(2),i
[L(n)2 ]. According to the summary of the construction of A˜1:L[G(n)] in the last part of
Section IV-A, the length of sequence ∆(V )(2),i−1 is
∣∣L(n)2 ∣∣.
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For i ∈ [1, L], given T˜(2),i
[H(n)U(2)|V ] and V˜ ni the encoder forms T˜(2),i[(H(n)U(2)|V )C] by using SC
encoding: deterministic for T˜(2),i
[L(n)U(2)|V ], and random for T˜(2),i[(H(n)U(2)|V )C \ L(n)U(2)|V ].
For i ∈ [1, L], the encoder obtains Φ(U)(2),i , T˜(2),i
[(H(n)U(2)|V )C \ L(n)U(2)|V Y(1)]. Also, it obtains Υ(U)(2) ,
T˜(2),L
[H(n)U(2)|V \L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)] from Block L. The transmitter additionally sends (Υ(U)(2) ,Φ(U)(2),1:L)⊕κ(U)ΥΦ(2)
to Receiver 2, where κ(U)ΥΦ(2) now is a uniformly distributed key with size L
∣∣(H(n)U(2)|V )C\L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)∣∣+∣∣H(n)U(2)|V \ L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)∣∣ that is privately shared between transmitter and Receiver 2.
Figure 9 may graphically represent this construction of T˜n(2),1:L if we do the following substitutions:
F (n)0 ← Q(n)0 , F (n)2 ← Q(n)2 , J (n)0 ← B(n)0 , J (n)2 ← B(n)2 , D(n)2 ← N (n)2 , L(n)2 ←M(n)2 , ∅ ← O(n)2 ,(H(n)U(2)|V )C ← (H(n)U(2)|V U(1))C, O(U)(2),1:L ← ∅. Moreover, at Block i ∈ [2, L], the encoder repeats
Ψ
(U)
(2),i−1 ⊕ κ
(U)
Ψ instead of Ψ
(U)
(2),i−1.
2) Construction of T˜n(1),i. Associated to T˜
n
(1),i, now we have defined Q
(n)
0 , Q(n)1 , B(n)0 and B(n)1 as in
(48)–(51), and O(n)1 , N (n)1 and M(n)1 as in (52), (53) and (55) respectively.
The construction of T˜n(2),1:L is graphically summarized in Figure 10. For i ∈ [1, L], let W
(U)
(1),i be a
uniformly distributed vector of length
∣∣B(n)0 ∪B(n)1 ∣∣ that represents the entire private message intended
for legitimate Receiver 1. The encoder forms T˜(1),i
[B(n)0 ∪ B(n)1 ] by simply storing W (U)(1),i. Then, we
define Θ(U)(1),i , T˜(1),i
[B(n)1 ], which is required by Receiver 1 to reliably estimate T˜n(1),i. Hence, for
i ∈ [1, L− 1], sequence Θ(U)(1),i+1 is repeated in T˜(1),i
[N (n)1 ] ⊆ T˜(1),i[Q(n)0 ].
For i ∈ [1, L], let S(U)(1),i be a uniform vector that represents the confidential message intended for
Receiver 1. At Block 1, S(U)(1),1 has size
∣∣(Q(n)0 ∪ Q(n)1 ) \ (O(n)1 ∪ N (n)1 ∪M(n)1 )∣∣ and is stored in
T˜(1),1
[(Q(n)0 ∪ Q(n)1 ) \ (O(n)1 ∪ N (n)1 ∪M(n)1 )]; for i ∈ [2, L − 1], S(U)(1),i has size ∣∣Q(n)0 \ (O(n)1 ∪
N (n)1 ∪M(n)1
)∣∣ and is stored in T˜(1),i[Q(n)0 \ (O(n)1 ∪ N (n)1 ∪M(n)1 )]; and at Block L, S(U)(1),L has
size
∣∣Q(n)0 ∣∣ and is stored into T˜(1),L[Q(n)0 ]. Moreover, for i ∈ [1, L] we define Λ(U)(1),i , T˜(1),i[Q(n)1 ].
For i ∈ [2, L], Λ(U)(1),i−1 is repeated in T˜(1),i
[Q(n)1 ]. Hence, Λ(U)(1),1, which contains part of S(U)(1),1, is
replicated in all blocks.
Furthermore, for i ∈ [1, L− 1], the encoder repeats [Π(V )(1),i+1∆(V )(1),i+1], which contains part of A˜ni+1,
in T˜(1),i
[M(n)1 ]. According to the summary of the construction of A˜1:L[G(n)] in the last part of
Section IV-A, the overall length of
[
Π
(V )
(1),i+1,∆
(V )
(1),i+1
]
is
∣∣M(n)1 ∣∣.
Then, for i ∈ [1, L], given T˜(1),i
[H(n)U(1)|V U(2)], V˜ ni and U˜n(2),i, the encoder forms the remaining entries
of T˜n(1),i by using SC encoding. Now, T˜(1),i
[(H(n)U(1)|V U(2))C] must depend not only on V˜ ni , but also
on U˜n(2),i. Moreover, T˜(1),i
[L(n)U(1)|V U(2)] is formed by performing deterministic SC encoding, while
T˜(1),i
[(H(n)U(1)|V U(2))C \ L(n)U(1)|V U(2)] is drawn randomly.
For i ∈ [1, L], we define sequences O(U)(1),i , T˜(1),i
[(H(n)U(1)|V U(2))C ∩ H(n)U(1)|V \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)] and
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Set B(n)1
Set B(n)0
formed by SC decoding
Set Q(n)1
Set B(n)1
Set B(n)0
Contains S
(U)
(1),i
Contains ⇤
(U)
(1),i 1 ⇢ S(U)(1),1
Contains part of W
(U)
(1),i
Contains part of W
(U)
(1),i
Contains S
(U)
(1),L
Contains S
(U)
(1),L
Contains S
(U)
(1),LContains S
(U)
(1),1
Contains part of W
(U)
(1),1
Contains part of W
(U)
(1),1 Contains part of W
(U)
(1),L
Contains part of W
(U)
(1),L
⇤
(U)
(1),1...
⇤
(U)
(1),i 1
...
⇤
(U)
(1),i
⇤
(U)
(1),L 1
⇥
(U)
(1),i
Set Q(n)1
Contains S
(U)
(1),1 Contains ⇤
(U)
(1),L 1 ⇢ S(U)(1),1
...
⇥
(U)
(1),L
[⇧
(V )
(1),2, 
(V )
(1),2] [⇧
(V )
(1),i+1, 
(V )
(1),i+1]
......
Inner-layer A˜n1
[⇧
(V )
(1),L, 
(V )
(1),L][⇧
(V )
(1),i, 
(V )
(1),i]
Block 1 Block i Block L
Inner-layer A˜nL
formed by SC decoding formed by SC decoding
Contains [⇧
(V )
(1),2, 
(V )
(1),2] Contains [⇧
(V )
(1),i+1, 
(V )
(1),i+1]
Set Q(n)1
Set B(n)1
Set B(n)0
Inner-layer A˜ni
Contains ⇥
(U)
(1),2 Contains ⇥
(U)
(1),i+1
SetM(n)1 ⇢ Q(n)0 SetM(n)1 ⇢ Q(n)0 SetM(n)1 ⇢ Q(n)0
Set N (n)1 ⇢ F (n)0Set N (n)1 ⇢ F (n)0Set N (n)1 ⇢ F (n)0
O
(U)
(1),i O
(U)
(1),L
O
(U)
(1),i+1   (U)O
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
O
(U)
(1),2   (U)OSet O(n)1 ⇢ Q(n)0 Set O(n)1 ⇢ Q(n)0 Set O(n)1 ⇢ Q(n)0
Q(n)0 \(O(n)1 [N (n)1 [M(n)1 ) Q(n)0 \(O(n)1 [N (n)1 [M(n)1 ) Q(n)0 \(O(n)1 [N (n)1 [M(n)1 )
Contains O¯
(U)
(1),2
Contains O¯
(U)
(1),i+1 Contains S
(U)
(1),L
Set
 H(n)U(1)|V U(2) C Set  H(n)U(1)|V U(2) C Set  H(n)U(1)|V U(2) C
⇥
(U)
(1),2
⇥
(U)
(1),i+1
Fig. 10. Construction of outer-layer T˜(1),1:L associated to Receiver 1 when the PCS must aproach the corner point
(R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊆ R(2)MI-WTBC. For any Block i ∈ [1, L], blue and green colors are used to represent the elements
of T˜n(1),i that contain independent private and confidential information, respectively. For i ∈ [1, L − 1], orange, brown and
blue-purple colors represent those entries that contain information repeated from Block i+ 1: T˜(1),i[M(n)1 ] (in orange) repeats
information from A˜ni+1, T˜(1),i[N (n)1 ] (in brown) repeats Θ(U)(1),i+1, and T˜(1),i[O(n)1 ] (in blue-purple) repeats O¯(U)(1),i+1. Recall that
Λ
(U)
(1),1, which contain part of the confidential information of Block 1, is replicated in T˜(1),2:L[Q(n)1 ] (in red-purple). Finally, for
i ∈ [1, L], the elements of T˜(1),i[(H(n)U(1)|V U(2))
C] (in red) are drawn by SC encoding.
Φ
(U)
(1),i , T˜(1),i
[(H(n)U(1)|V )C \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)], where notice that [O(U)(1),i,Φ(U)(1),i] contains those entries of
T˜(1),i
[(H(n)U(1)|V U(2))C] that are needed by Receiver 1 to reliably estimate T˜n(1),i, that is, [O(U)(1),i,Φ(U)(1),i] =
T˜(1),i
[(H(n)U(1)|V U(2))C\L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)]. Let κ(U)O be a uniformly distributed key with size ∣∣(H(n)U(1)|V U(2))C∩
H(n)U(1)|V \ L
(n)
U(1)|V Y(1)
∣∣ that is privately-shared between transmitter and Receiver 1. For i ∈ [1, L],
we define O¯(U)(1),i , O
(U)
(1),i ⊕ κ
(U)
O . Since O
(U)
(1),i is required by Receiver 1 to estimate T˜
n
(1),i, for
i ∈ [1, L − 1] the encoder repeats O¯(U)(1),i+1 in T˜(1),i
[O(n)1 ]. Notice that κ(U)O is reused in all blocks,
so it is clear that its size becomes negligible in terms of rate for L large enough. Furthermore,
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the encoder obtains Υ(U)(1) , T˜(1),1
[H(n)U(1)|V \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)] from Block 1. The transmitter additionally
sends
(
Υ
(U)
(1) ,Φ
(U)
(1),1:L
)⊕ κ(U)ΥΦ(1) to Receiver 1, where κ(U)ΥΦ(1) is a uniformly distributed key with size
L
∣∣(H(n)U(1)|V )C \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(1)|V \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)∣∣ that is privately shared between transmitter and
Receiver 1.
Finally, for i ∈ [1, L], the encoder obtains X˜ni , f
(
V˜ ni , U˜
n
(1),i, U˜
n
(2),i
)
, where recall that f(·) may be
any deterministic one-to-one function. The transmitter sends X˜ni over the WTBC, which induces the
channel outputs (Y˜ n(1),i, Y˜
n
(2),i, Z˜
n
i ).
Remark 8. Consider the construction of T˜n(k),1:L to achieve (R
?k
S(1)
, R?kS(2) , R
?k
W(1)
, R?kW(2)) ∈ R
(k)
MI-WTBC. If we
consider that I(U(k);Y(k)|V ) < I(U(k);Z|V ), according to (46) and (47), notice that
∣∣F (n)0 ∣∣−∣∣J (n)k ∣∣ < 0.
Consequently, if k = 1, for i ∈ [1, L − 1] the encoder cannot repeat entirely the sequence Θ¯(U)(1),i+1 of
length
∣∣J (n)1 ∣∣ in some elements of T˜(1),i[F (n)0 ]. Similarly, if k = 2, for i ∈ [2, L] the encoder cannot
repeat the sequence Ψ¯(U)(2),i−1 of length
∣∣J (n)2 ∣∣ in T˜(2),i[F (n)0 ].
Therefore, under this assumption, the encoding strategy will be as follows. If k = 1, for i ∈ [1, L]
we will define ∆(U)(1),i as any part of Θ¯
(U)
(1),i with size
∣∣J (n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣F (n)0 ∣∣. For i ∈ [1, L − 1], the sequence
∆
(U)
(1),i+1 will be repeated in some part of the inner-layer A˜i
[I(n)], whereas the remaining elements of
Θ¯
(U)
(1),i+1 will be stored in T˜(1),i
[F (n)0 ]. Similarly, if k = 2, for i ∈ [1, L] we will define ∆(U)(2),i as any part
of Ψ¯(U)(2),i with size
∣∣J (n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣F (n)0 ∣∣. For i ∈ [2, L], the sequence ∆(U)(2),i−1 will be repeated in some part of
the inner-layer A˜i
[I(n)], whereas the remaining elements of Ψ¯(U)(2),i−1 will be repeated in T˜(2),i[F (n)0 ].
Remark 9. If we consider input distributions that imply (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ∈ R4+ for some
k ∈ [1, 2], it is clear that if I(U(k);Y(k)|V ) < I(U(k);Z|V ) then we must only consider those Situations
(among 1 to 3) in the inner-layer where I(V ;Y(k)) ≥ I(V ;Z). In this case, part of the elements of
the inner-layer that previously carried confidential information may be used now to carry ∆(U)(1),2:L or
∆
(U)
(2),1:L−1.
We will not go into the details of the encoding/decoding when I(U(k);Y(k)|V )<I(U(k);Z|V ) because
both the construction and the performance analysis will be very similar to those of the the contemplated
cases such that the outer-layer must repeat some elements of the inner-layer.
C. Decoding
By using κ(V )ΥΦ(k) and κ
(U)
ΥΦ(k)
, consider that
(
Φ
(V )
(k),1:L,Υ
(V )
(k)
)
and
(
Φ
(U)
(k),1:L,Υ
(U)
(k)
)
have been reliably
obtained by Receiver k ∈ [1, 2] before starting the decoding process.
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Decoding at Receiver 1
This receiver forms the estimates Aˆn1:L and Tˆ
n
(1),1:L of A˜
n
1:L and T˜
n
(1),1:L respectively by going forward,
i.e., from (Aˆn1 , Tˆ
n
(1),1) to (Aˆ
n
L, Tˆ
n
(1),L). For i ∈ [1, L], it forms Aˆni first, and then Tˆn(1),i.
The decoding process at Receiver 1 when the PCS must achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC or
R
(2)
MI-WTBC is summarized in Algorithm 3. Despite A˜
n
1:L does not carry information intended for Receiver 1
when the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC, recall that this receiver needs A˜
n
1:L to
reliably reconstruct T˜n(1),1:L.
In both cases, Receiver 1 constructs Aˆn1 and Tˆ
n
(1),1 as follows. Given
(
Υ
(V )
(1) ,Φ
(V )
(1),1
)
and
(
Υ
(U)
(1) ,Φ
(U)
(1),1
)
,
it knows A˜1
[(L(n)V |Y(1))C] and T˜(1),1[(L(n)U(1)|V Y(1))C], respectively. Therefore, from observations Y˜ n(1),1 and
A˜1
[(L(n)V |Y(1))C], it entirely constructs Aˆn1 by performing SC decoding. Then, from sequences Y˜ n(1),1,
T˜(1),1
[(L(n)U(1)|V Y(1))C] and Vˆ n1 = Aˆn1Gn, this receiver form Tˆn(1),1.
Recall that Λ(V )1 and Λ
(U)
(1),1 have been replicated in all blocks. Thus, Receiver 1 obtains Λˆ
(V )
1:L =
Aˆ1
[R(n)Λ ], while it obtains Λˆ(U)(1),1:L = Tˆ(1),1[F (n)1 ] or Λˆ(U)(1),1:L = Tˆ(1),1[Q(n)1 ] depending on whether the
PCS must achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC or R
(2)
MI-WTBC respectively.
For i ∈ [1, L− 1], consider that Aˆn1:i and Tˆn(1),1:i have already been constructed. Then, the construction
of Aˆni+1 and Tˆ
n
(1),i+1 is slightly different depending on whether the PCS must achieve the corner point
of R(1)MI-WTBC (k = 1) or R
(2)
MI-WTBC (k = 2):
k = 1) From Aˆni and Tˆ
n
(1),i, it obtains Υ
′(V )
(1),i+1 ,
(
Ψˆ
(V )
1,i , Γˆ
(V )
2,i , Πˆ
(V )
(2),i, Θˆ
(V )
i+1, Γˆ
(V )
i+1, Λˆ
(V )
i+1
)
. Notice
in Algorithm 3 that secret-keys κ(V )Θ and κ
(V )
Γ are needed to obtain Θˆ
(V )
i+1 and Γˆ
(V )
i+1, respectively.
Moreover, Ψ(V )i−1 and Γ
(V )
i−1 may also be necessary for this purpose, and notice that they are available
because
(
A˜ni−1, Tˆ
n
(1),i−1
)
has already been constructed. Recall that part of Θˆ(V )i+1 and Γˆ
(V )
i+1 are obtained
from Tˆn(1),i. On the other hand, from Tˆ
n
(1),i, it obtains Υ
′(U)
(1),i+1 ,
(
Θˆ
(U)
(1),i+1, Λˆ
(U)
(1),i+1
)
, and κ(U)Θ is
needed to get Θˆ(U)(1),i+1.
k = 2) From Aˆni and Tˆ
n
(1),i, it obtains Υˆ
′(V )
(1),i+1 ,
( ˆ¯Ψ(V )1,i , ˆ¯Γ(V )2,i , Πˆ(V )(2),i, Θˆ(V )i+1, Γˆ(V )i+1, Λˆ(V )i+1) and Υ′(U)(1),i+1 ,(
Θˆ
(U)
(1),i+1, Λˆ
(U)
(1),i+1, Oˆ
(U)
(1),i+1
)
. Now, for i ∈ [1, L − 1] the encoder have repeated an encrypted
version of Ψ(V )i and Γ
(V )
i at Block i + 1, whereas Θ
(V )
i+1, Γ
(V )
i+1 and Θ
(U)
(1),i+1 have been repeated
in Block i directly. Hence, notice in Algorithm 3 that secret-keys κ(V )Ψ and κ
(V )
Γ are needed,
whereas neither κ(V )Θ nor κ
(U)
Θ are used in this case. Moreover, notice that Receiver 1 now obtains
Oˆ
(U)
(1),i+1 = Tˆ(1),i[O
(n)
1 ]⊕ κ(U)O , which recall that contains part of the elements of Tˆn(1),i+1 that have
been drawn by performing SC encoding and are needed by Receiver 1 to reliably reconstruct Tˆn(1),i+1.
Finally, given
(
Υ
′(V )
(1),i+1,Φ
(V )
(1),i+1
) ⊇ Aˆi+1[(L(n)V |Y(1))C] and Y˜ n(1),i+1, it performs SC decoding to con-
struct Aˆni+1. Then, given
(
Υ
′(U)
(1),i+1,Φ
(U)
(1),i+1
) ⊇ Tˆ(1),i+1[(L(n)U(1)|V Y(1))C], Vˆ ni+1 = Aˆni+1Gn and Y˜ n(1),i+1, it
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performs SC decoding to construct Tˆn(1),i+1.
Algorithm 3 Decoding at Receiver 1 when PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(k)MI-WTBC
Require: Υ(V )(1) , Φ
(V )
(1),1:L, Υ
(U)
(1) , Φ
(U)
(1),1:L, and Y˜
n
(1),1:L.
Require: if k = 1 then {κ(V )Γ , κ(V )Θ , κ(U)Θ } else {κ(V )Γ , κ(V )Ψ , κ(U)O }
1 Aˆn1 ←
(
Υ
(V )
(1) ,Φ
(V )
(1),1, Y˜
n
(1),1
)
. by using SC decoding
2 Tˆn(1),1 ←
(
Υ
(U)
(1) ,Φ
(U)
(1),1, Aˆ
n
1Gn, Y˜
n
(1),1
)
. by using SC decoding
3 Λˆ
(V )
2:L ← Aˆ1
[R(n)Λ ]
4 if k = 1 then Λˆ(U)2:L ← Tˆ(1),1
[F (n)1 ] else Λˆ(U)2:L ← Tˆ(1),1[Q(n)1 ]
5 for i = 1 to L− 1 do
6 Πˆ
(V )
(2),i ← Aˆi[I(n) ∩ G
(n)
2 ]
7 if k = 1 then
8 Ψˆ
(V )
i ← Aˆi[C(n)2 ] and Γˆ(V )i ← Aˆi[C(n)1,2 ]
9 ˆ¯Θ
(V )
1,i+1 ← Aˆi[R(n)1 ] and ˆ¯Θ(V )2,i+1 ← Aˆi[R′(n)1,2 ]⊕ Ψˆ(V )2,i−1
10 ˆ¯Γ
(V )
1,i+1 ← Aˆi[R(n)1,2 ]⊕ Γˆ(V )1,i−1 and ˆ¯Γ(V )2,i+1 ← Aˆi[R′(n)1 ]
11 ∆
(U)
(1),i+1 ← Tˆ(1),i[L
(n)
1 ] . ∆
(U)
(1),i+1 =
[ ˆ¯Θ(V )3,i+1, ˆ¯Γ(V )3,i+1]
12 Θˆ
(V )
i+1 ←
[ ˆ¯Θ(V )1,i+1, ˆ¯Θ(V )2,i+1, ˆ¯Θ(V )3,i+1]⊕ κ(V )Θ
13 Γˆ
(V )
i+1 ←
[ˆ¯Γ(V )1,i+1, ˆ¯Γ(V )2,i+1, ˆ¯Γ(V )3,i+1]⊕ κ(V )Γ
14 Υˆ
′(V )
(1),i+1 ←
(
Ψˆ
(V )
1,i , Γˆ
(V )
2,i , Πˆ
(V )
(2),i, Θˆ
(V )
i+1, Γˆ
(V )
i+1, Λˆ
(V )
i+1
)
15 Θˆ
(U)
(1),i+1 ← Tˆ(1),i[D
(n)
1 ]⊕ κ(U)Θ
16 Υˆ
′(U)
(1),i+1 ←
(
Θˆ
(U)
(1),i+1, Λˆ
(U)
(1),i+1
)
17 else
18 Ψˆ
(V )
i ← Aˆi[C(n)2 ] and Γˆ(V )i ← Aˆi[C(n)1,2 ]
19 ˆ¯Ψ
(V )
i ← Ψˆ(V )i ⊕ κ(V )Ψ and ˆ¯Γ(V )i ← Γˆ(V )i ⊕ κ(V )Γ
20 Θˆ
(V )
1,i+1 ← Aˆi[R(n)1 ] and Θˆ(V )2,i+1 ← Aˆi[R′(n)1,2 ]⊕ ˆ¯Ψ(V )2,i−1
21 Γˆ
(V )
1,i+1 ← Aˆi[R(n)1,2 ]⊕ ˆ¯Γ(V )1,i−1 and Γˆ(V )2,i+1 ← Aˆi[R′(n)1 ]
22
(
Πˆ
(V )
(1),i+1,∆
(U)
(1),i+1
)← Tˆ(1),i[M(n)1 ] . ∆(U)(1),i+1 = [Θˆ(V )3,i+1, Γˆ(V )3,i+1]
23 Υˆ
′(V )
(1),i+1 ←
( ˆ¯Ψ(V )1,i , ˆ¯Γ(V )2,i , Πˆ(V )(2),i, Πˆ(V )(1),i+1, Θˆ(V )i+1, Γˆ(V )i+1, Λˆ(V )i+1)
24 Θˆ
(U)
(1),i+1 ← Tˆ(1),i[N
(n)
1 ]
25 Oˆ
(U)
(1),i+1 ← Tˆ(1),i[O
(n)
1 ]⊕ κ(U)O
26 Υˆ
′(U)
(1),i+1 ←
(
Θˆ
(U)
(1),i+1, Λˆ
(U)
(1),i+1, Oˆ
(U)
(1),i+1
)
27 end if
28 Aˆni+1 ←
(
Υˆ
′(V )
(1),i+1,Φ
(V )
(1),i+1, Y˜
n
(1),i+1
)
29 Tˆn(1),i+1 ←
(
Υˆ
′(U)
(1),i+1,Φ
(U)
(1),i+1, Aˆ
n
i+1Gn, Y˜
n
(1),i+1
)
30 end for
31 Return
(
Wˆ(1),1:L, Sˆ(1),1:L
)← (Aˆni+1Tˆn(1),i+1)
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Decoding at Receiver 2
This receiver forms the estimates Aˆn1:L and Tˆ
n
(2),1:L of A˜
n
1:L and T˜
n
(2),1:L respectively by going backward,
that is, from (AˆnL, Tˆ
n
(2),L) to (Aˆ
n
1 , Tˆ
n
(2),1).
The decoding process at Receiver 2 when the PCS must achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC or
R
(2)
MI-WTBC is summarized in Algorithm 4. Despite A˜
n
1:L does not carry information intended for Receiver 2
when the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC, recall that this receiver needs A˜
n
1:L to
reliably reconstruct T˜n(2),1:L.
In both cases, Receiver 2 constructs AˆnL and Tˆ
n
(2),L as follows. Given
(
Υ
(V )
(2) ,Φ
(V )
(2),L
)
and
(
Υ
(U)
(2) ,Φ
(U)
(2),L
)
,
it knows A˜L
[(L(n)V |Y(2))C] and T˜(2),L[(L(n)U(2)|V Y(2))C], respectively. Hence, from observations Y˜ n(2),L and
A˜L
[(L(n)V |Y(2))C], it entirely constructs AˆnL by performing SC decoding. Then, from sequences Y˜ n(2),L,
T˜(2),L
[(L(n)U(2)|V Y(2))C] and Vˆ nL = AˆnLGn, this receiver form Tˆn(2),L.
Recall that Λ(V )1 and Λ
(U)
(2),1 have been replicated in all blocks. Thus, Receiver 2 obtains Λˆ
(V )
1:L =
AˆL
[R(n)Λ ], while it gets Λˆ(U)(2),1:L = Tˆ(2),L[F (n)2 ] or Λˆ(U)(2),1:L = Tˆ(2),L[Q(n)2 ] depending on whether the
PCS must achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC or R
(2)
MI-WTBC respectively.
For i ∈ [2, L], consider that Aˆni:L and Tˆn(2),i:L have already been formed. Then, the construction of
Aˆni−1 and Tˆ
n
(2),i−1 is slightly different depending on whether the PCS must achieve the corner point of
R
(1)
MI-WTBC (k = 1) or R
(2)
MI-WTBC (k = 2):
k = 1) From Aˆni and Tˆ
n
(2),i, it obtains Υˆ
′(V )
(2),i−1 ,
( ˆ¯Θ(V )1,i , ˆ¯Γ(V )2,i , Πˆ(V )(2),i−1, Ψˆ(V )i−1, Γˆ(V )i−1, Λˆ(V )i−1) and
Υˆ
′(U)
(2),i−1 ,
(
Ψˆ
(U)
(2),i−1, Λˆ
(U)
(2),i−1, Oˆ
(U)
(2),i−1
)
. Notice in Algorithm 4 that κ(V )Θ and κ
(V )
Γ are needed
because the encoder have repeated an encrypted version of Θˆ(V )i and Γˆ
(V )
i at Block i−1. In order to
obtain Ψˆ(V )i−1 and Γˆ
(V )
i−1, recall that part of these sequences may have been repeated in T˜
n
(2),i. Moreover,
notice that part of the encrypted versions of Θˆ(V )i+1 and Γˆ
(V )
i+1 may also be needed to obtain Ψˆ
(V )
i−1 and
Γˆ
(V )
i−1, which are available because
(
A˜ni+1, Tˆ
n
(2),i+1
)
has already been constructed. Now Receiver 2
obtains Ψ(U)(2),i−1 and Oˆ
(U)
(2),i−1 = Tˆ(2),i[O
(n)
2 ] ⊕ κ(U)O from T˜n(2),i, where recall that Oˆ
(U)
(2),i−1 contains
part of the elements of Tˆn(2),i−1 that have been drawn by performing SC encoding.
k = 2) From Aˆni and Tˆ
n
(2),i, it obtains Υˆ
′(V )
(2),i−1 ,
(
Θˆ
(V )
1,i , Γˆ
(V )
2,i , Πˆ
(V )
(2),i−1, Ψˆ
(V )
i−1, Γˆ
(V )
i−1, Λˆ
(V )
i−1
)
and
Υˆ
′(U)
(2),i−1 ,
(
Ψˆ
(U)
(2),i−1, Λˆ
(U)
(2),i−1
)
. Now, the Receiver 2 uses κ(V )Ψ , κ
(V )
Γ and κ
(U)
Ψ because the encoder
have repeated an encrypted version of Ψˆ(V )i−1, Γˆ
(V )
i−1 and Ψˆ
(U)
i−1 in Block i.
Finally, given
(
Υ
′(V )
(2),i−1,Φ
(V )
(2),i−1
) ⊇ Aˆi−1[(L(n)V |Y(2))C] and Y˜ n(2),i−1, it performs SC decoding to con-
struct Aˆni−1. Then, given
(
Υ
′(U)
(2),i−1,Φ
(U)
(2),i−1
) ⊇ Tˆ(2),i−1[(L(n)U(2)|V Y(2))C], Vˆ ni−1 = Aˆni−1Gn and Y˜ n(2),i−1, it
performs SC decoding to construct Tˆn(2),i−1.
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Algorithm 4 Decoding at Receiver 2 when PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(k)MI-WTBC
Require: Υ(V )(2) , Φ
(V )
(2),1:L, Υ
(U)
(2) , Φ
(U)
(2),1:L, and Y˜
n
(2),1:L.
Require: if k = 1 then {κ(V )Γ , κ(V )Θ , κ(U)O } else {κ(V )Γ , κ(V )Ψ , κ(U)Ψ }
1 AˆnL ←
(
Υ
(V )
(2) ,Φ
(V )
(2),L, Y˜
n
(2),L
)
. by using SC decoding
2 Tˆn(2),L ←
(
Υ
(U)
(2) ,Φ
(U)
(2),L, Aˆ
n
LGn, Y˜
n
(2),L
)
. by using SC decoding
3 Λˆ
(V )
1:L−1 ← AˆL
[R(n)Λ ]
4 if k = 1 then Λˆ(U)1:L−1 ← Tˆ(2),L
[F (n)2 ] else Λˆ(U)1:L−1 ← Tˆ(2),L[Q(n)2 ]
5 for i = L to 2 do
6 Πˆ
(V )
(2),i−1 ← Aˆi[R
(n)
S ]
7 if k = 1 then
8 Θˆ
(V )
i ← Aˆi[C(n)1 ] and Γˆ(V )i ← Aˆi[C(n)1,2 ]
9 ˆ¯Θ
(V )
i ← Θˆ(V )i ⊕ κ(V )Θ and ˆ¯Γ(V )i ← Γˆ(V )i ⊕ κ(V )Γ
10 Ψˆ
(V )
1,i−1 ← Aˆi[R(n)2 ] and Ψˆ(V )2,i−1 ← Aˆi[R′(n)1,2 ]⊕ ˆ¯Θ(V )2,i+1
11 Γˆ
(V )
1,i−1 ← Aˆi[R(n)1,2 ]⊕ ˆ¯Γ(V )1,i+1 and Γˆ(V )2,i−1 ← Aˆi[R′(n)2 ]
12 ∆
(U)
(2),i−1 ← Tˆ(2),i[M
(n)
2 ] . ∆
(U)
(2),i−1 =
[
Ψˆ
(V )
3,i−1, Γˆ
(V )
3,i−1
]
13 Υˆ
′(V )
(1),i−1 ←
( ˆ¯Θ(V )1,i , ˆ¯Γ(V )2,i , Πˆ(V )(2),i−1, Ψˆ(V )i−1, Γˆ(V )i−1, Λˆ(V )i−1)
14 Ψˆ
(U)
(2),i−1 ← Tˆ(2),i[N
(n)
2 ]
15 Oˆ
(U)
(2),i−1 ← Tˆ(2),i[O
(n)
2 ]⊕ κ(U)O
16 Υˆ
′(U)
(2),i−1 ←
(
Ψˆ
(U)
(2),i−1, Λˆ
(U)
(2),i−1, Oˆ
(U)
(2),i−1
)
17 else
18 Θˆ
(V )
i ← Aˆi[C(n)1 ] and Γˆ(V )i ← Aˆi[C(n)1,2 ]
19 ˆ¯Ψ
(V )
1,i−1 ← Aˆi[R(n)2 ] and ˆ¯Ψ(V )2,i−1 ← Aˆi[R′(n)1,2 ]⊕ Θˆ(V )2,i+1
20 ˆ¯Γ
(V )
1,i−1 ← Aˆi[R(n)1,2 ]⊕ Γˆ(V )1,i+1 and ˆ¯Γ(V )2,i−1 ← Aˆi[R′(n)2 ]
21 ∆
(U)
(2),i−1 ← Tˆ(2),i[L
(n)
2 ] . ∆
(U)
(2),i−1 =
[ ˆ¯Ψ(V )3,i−1, ˆ¯Γ(V )3,i−1]
22 Ψˆ
(V )
i−1 ←
[ ˆ¯Ψ(V )1,i−1, ˆ¯Ψ(V )2,i−1, ˆ¯Ψ(V )3,i−1]⊕ κ(V )Ψ
23 Γˆ
(V )
i−1 ←
[ˆ¯Γ(V )1,i−1, ˆ¯Γ(V )2,i−1, ˆ¯Γ(V )3,i−1]⊕ κ(V )Γ
24 Υˆ
′(V )
(2),i−1 ←
(
Θˆ
(V )
1,i , Γˆ
(V )
2,i , Πˆ
(V )
(2),i−1, Ψˆ
(V )
i−1, Γˆ
(V )
i−1, Λˆ
(V )
i−1
)
25 Ψˆ
(U)
(2),i−1 ← Tˆ(2),i[D
(n)
2 ]⊕ κ(U)Ψ
26 Υˆ
′(U)
(2),i−1 ←
(
Ψˆ
(U)
(2),i−1, Λˆ
(U)
(2),i−1
)
27 end if
28 Aˆni−1 ←
(
Υˆ
′(V )
(2),i−1,Φ
(V )
(2),i−1, Y˜
n
(2),i−1
)
29 Tˆn(2),i−1 ←
(
Υˆ
′(U)
(2),i−1,Φ
(U)
(2),i−1, Aˆ
n
i−1Gn, Y˜
n
(2),i−1
)
30 end for
31 Return
(
Wˆ(2),1:L, Sˆ(2),1:L
)← (Aˆni−1Tˆn(2),i−1)
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Remark 10. According to the previous decoding algorithms, Receiver k ∈ [1, 2] decodes both A˜ni and
T˜n(k),i from Block i ∈ [1, L] before moving to adjacent blocks (polar-based jointly decoding). Indeed,
Receiver 1 needs to obtain first Tˆn(1),i before decoding A˜
n
i+1 because
[
Π
(V )
(1),i+1,∆
(V )
(1),i+1
]
, which is required
by this receiver to reliably estimate A˜ni+1, is repeated in T˜
n
(1),i. Similarly, Receiver 2 needs ∆
(V )
(2),i−1 to
reliably decode A˜ni−1, but it is repeated in Tˆ
n
(2),i.
Consider another decoding strategy for Receiver k ∈ [1, 2] that obtains first Aˆn1:L, and then decodes
the outer-layer T˜n(k),1:L. We refer to this decoding strategy as polar-based successive decoding. Clearly,
(R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC is not achievable by using successive decoding because, accord-
ing to the summary of the construction of A˜1:L
[G(n)] in the last part of Section IV-A, in all cases T˜n(k),i
contains elements required by Receiver 1 to reliably decode A˜ni+1. Furthermore, for the same reason,
all situations where I(V ;Y(k)) < I(V ;Z) for some k ∈ [1, 2] are not possible by using this strategy.
Consequently, it is clear that joint decoding enlarges the inner-bound on the achievable region for a
particular distribution4.
V. PERFORMANCE OF THE POLAR CODING SCHEME
The analysis of the polar coding scheme of Section IV leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let (X , pY(1)Y(2)Z|X ,Y(1) ×Y(2) ×Z) be an arbitrary WTBC where X ∈ {0, 1}. The PCS
in Section IV achieves any corner point (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ⊂ R(k)MI-WTBC given in (3)–(6) for any
k ∈ [1, 2].
Corollary 1. The PCS achieves any rate tuple of R(k)MI-WTBC defined in Proposition 2.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows in four steps and is provided in the following subsections. In Sec-
tion V-A we show that the PCS approaches (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ⊂ R(k)MI-WTBC for any k ∈ [1, 2]. In
Section V-B we prove that, for all i ∈ [1, L], the joint distribution of (V˜ ni , U˜n(1),i, U˜n(2),i, X˜ni , Y˜ n(1),i, Y˜ n(2),i, Z˜ni )
is asymptotically indistinguishable of the one of the original DMS that is used for the polar code
construction. Finally, in Section V-C and Section V-D we show that the polar coding scheme satisfies
the reliability and the secrecy conditions given in (1) and (2) respectively.
4Although for a particular distribution the inner-bound is strictly larger with joint decoding, we cannot affirm that this decoding
strategy enlarges RMI-WTBC: rate points that are not achievable with successive decoding for this particular distribution may be
achievable under another distribution.
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A. Transmission rates
We prove that the PCS described in Section IV approaches (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ⊂ R(k)MI-WTBC
defined in (3)–(6) for any k ∈ [1, 2]. Also, we show that the overall length of secret keys κ(V )Γ , κ(V )ΥΦ(1) ,
κ
(V )
ΥΦ(2)
, κ(U)O , κ
(U)
ΥΦ(1)
, κ(U)ΥΦ(2) is asymptotically negligible in terms of rate, and so is the overall length of
κ
(V )
Θ and κ
(U)
Θ if the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R
(1)
MI-WTBC, or that of κ
(V )
Ψ and κ
(U)
Ψ if
the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC. Moreover, we show that so is the amount of
randomness required by the encoding (number of entries drawn by random SC encoding).
Private message rate
1) Rate of W(k). For i ∈ [1, L], we have W(k),i =
[
W
(V )
(k),i,W
(U)
(k),i
]
, where W (V )(k),i = A˜i
[C(n)] and
W
(U)
(k),i = T˜(k),i
[J (n)0 ∪ J (n)k ]. Therefore, we obtain
1
nL
L∑
i=1
(∣∣W (V )(k),i∣∣+ ∣∣W (U)(k),i∣∣) (a)= 1n(∣∣∣H(n)V \ H(n)V |Z∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣H(n)U(k)|V \ H(n)U(k)|V Z∣∣∣)
(b)
=
1
n
(∣∣H(n)V ∣∣− ∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(k)|V ∣∣− ∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z∣∣)
n→∞−−−→ H(V )−H(V |Z) +H(U(k)|V )−H(U(k)|V Z),
where (a) holds because C(n) = H(n)V |Z and by the definition of J
(n)
0 and J (n)k in (42) and (43)
respectively; (b) follows from the fact that H(n)V ⊇ H(n)V |Z and H
(n)
U(k)|V ⊇ H
(n)
U(k)|V Z ; and the limit
holds by the source polarization theorem [8].
2) Rate of W(k¯). For i ∈ [1, L], all private information W(k¯),i is carried in layer T˜n(k¯),i. Specifically, we
have W (U)
(k¯),i
= T˜(k¯),i
[B(n)0 ∪ B(n)k ]. Hence, we obtain
1
nL
L∑
i=1
∣∣W (U)
(k¯),i
∣∣ (a)= 1
n
∣∣∣H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k) \ H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z∣∣∣
(b)
=
1
n
∣∣H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)∣∣− ∣∣H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z∣∣
n→∞−−−→ H(U(k¯)|V U(k))−H(U(k¯)|V U(k)Z),
where (a) holds by definition of B(n)0 and B(n)k¯ in (50) and (51) respectively; (b) holds because
H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k) ⊇ H
(n)
U(k¯)|V U(k)Z ; and the limit holds by the source polarization theorem [8].
Therefore, the PCS attains R?kW(k) and R
?k
W(k¯)
defined in (5) and (6) respectively.
Confidential message rate
According to the PCS described in Section IV, to approach (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ⊂ R(k)MI-WTBC,
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the inner-layer A˜n1:L and the outer-layer T˜
n
(k),1:L carry confidential information S(k) intended for Re-
ceiver k, while the outer-layer T˜n
(k¯),1:L
carries confidential information S(k¯) intended for Receiver k¯.
1) Rate of S(k). First, consider the confidential information S
(V )
(k) that is carried in the inner-layer A˜
n
1:L.
From Section IV-A, in all cases we have S(V )(k),1 = A˜1
[I(n)∪G(n)1 ∪G(n)1,2 ]; for i ∈ [2, L−1], we have
S
(V )
(k),i = A˜i
[I(n)]; and S(V )(k),L = A˜L[I(n) ∪ G(n)2 ]. Recall that the definition of the set I(n) depends
on whether the PCS must achieve the corner point of regions R(1)MI-WTBC or R
(2)
MI-WTBC.
If the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC, we have∣∣I(n)∣∣ (a)= ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)1 ∣∣
(b)
=
{∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣}+
(c)
=
{∣∣∣H(n)V |Z ∩ L(n)V |Y(1)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(H(n)V |Z)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣}+
=
{∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣− ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣}+, (56)
where (a) holds by the definition of I(n) in (31); (b) holds because, in all cases when I(V ;Y(1)) <
I(V ;Z), we have
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ + ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ = ∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣ + ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣ + ∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣ + ∣∣R′(n)1 ∣∣ and ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ + ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ <∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ (see conditions in (28) and (29)) and, otherwise, we have ∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣+ ∣∣R′(n)1 ∣∣ = ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣,∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣ + ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣ = ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ and ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ + ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ (see condition in (27)); and (c)
follows from the partition of H(n)V defined in (19)–(26).
Similarly, if the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC, we have∣∣I(n)∣∣ (a)= ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣
− ∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)S ∣∣
(b)
=
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)2 ∣∣
(c)
=
{∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣}+
(d)
=
{∣∣∣H(n)V |Z ∩ L(n)V |Y(2)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(H(n)V |Z)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C∣∣∣}+
=
{∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣− ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(2))C∣∣}+, (57)
where (a) holds by the definition of I(n) in (33); (b) follows from (30) because the set R(n)S
has size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣R′(n)1 ∣∣; (c) holds because, in all cases contemplated in Section IV-A
when I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z), we have
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ + ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ = ∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣ + ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣ + ∣∣R(n)2 ∣∣ + ∣∣R′(n)2 ∣∣ and∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ (see condition in (29)) and, otherwise, we have ∣∣R(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣ =
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∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ and ∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣ + ∣∣R′(n)2 ∣∣ = ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ (see conditions in (27) and (28)); and (d) follows from the
partition of H(n)V defined in (19)–(26).
Consequently, the rate of S(V )(k) , which is carried by the inner-layer A˜
n
1:L, is
1
nL
L∑
i=1
∣∣S(V )(k),i∣∣ = (L− 2)nL ∣∣I(n)∣∣+ 1nL(∣∣I(n) ∪ G(n)1 ∪ G(n)1,2 ∣∣+ ∣∣I(n) ∪ G(n)2 ∣∣)
=
1
n
∣∣I(n)∣∣+ 1
nL
(∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1,2 ∣∣)
(a)
=
1
n
∣∣I(n)∣∣+ 1
nL
∣∣∣H(n)V |Z ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1) ∩ L(n)V |Y(2))C∣∣∣
(b)
≥ 1
n
∣∣I(n)∣∣+ 1
nL
(∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣− ∣∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣)
(c)
=
1
n
{∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣− ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣}+ + 1nL(∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣− ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣)
n→∞−−−→ {H(V |Z)−H(V |Y(k))}+ + 1L(H(V |Z)−H(V |Y(1)))
L→∞−−−−→ {H(V |Z)−H(V |Y(k))}+, (58)
where (a) holds by the partition of H(n)V in (19)–(26); (b) follows from applying elementary set
operations and because
∣∣L(n)V |Y(1) ∩ L(n)V |Y(2)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣L(n)V |Y(`)∣∣ for any ` ∈ [1, 2]; (c) follows from (56) and
(57); and the limit when n goes to infinity follows from applying source polarization [8].
Now, consider the confidential information S(U)(k) that is carried in the outer-layer T˜
n
(k),1:L. According
to Section IV-B, if i ∈ [2, L − 1], we have S(U)(k),i = T˜(k),i
[F (n)0 \ (D(n)k ∪ L(n)k )]. At Block 1,
if k = 1 then we have S(U)(1),1 = T˜(1),1
[(F (n)0 ∪ F (n)1 ) \ (D(n)1 ∪ L(n)1 )] and, otherwise, we have
S
(U)
(2),1 = T˜(2),1
[F (n)0 ∪ F (n)2 ]. Finally, at Block L, if k = 1 then we have S(U)(1),L = T˜(1),L[F (n)0 ],
while if k = 2 then S(U)(2),L = T˜(2),L
[F (n)0 \ (D(n)2 ∪L(n)2 )]. Consequently, the rate of S(U)(k) , which is
carried by the outer-layer T˜n(k),1:L, is
1
nL
L∑
i=1
∣∣S(U)(k),i∣∣ = 1n ∣∣F (n)0 \ (D(n)k ∪ L(n)k )∣∣+ 1nL ∣∣D(n)k ∪ L(n)k ∪ F (n)k ∣∣
(a)
≥ 1
n
(∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z∣∣− ∣∣(L(n)U(k)|V Y(k))C∣∣− {∣∣C(n)k ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)k¯ ∣∣}+)
+
1
nL
(∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Y(k)∣∣+ {∣∣C(n)k ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)k¯ ∣∣}+)
n→∞−−−→ H(U(k)|V Z)−H(U(k)|V Y(k))−
{
H(V |Y(k))−H(V |Z)
}+
+
1
L
(
H(U(k)|V Y(k)) +
{
H(V |Y(k))−H(V |Z)
}+)
L→∞−−−−→ H(U(k)|V Z)−H(U(k)|V Y(k))−
{
H(V |Y(k))−H(V |Z)
}+
, (59)
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where (a) holds by (40)–(46) and recall that
∣∣D(n)k ∣∣ + ∣∣F (n)k ∣∣ = ∣∣H(n)U(k)|V \ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k)∣∣, which is
greater or equal to
∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Y(k)∣∣; and the limit when n goes to infinity follows from applying the
source polarization theorem [8], where we have used similar reasoning as in (56) and (57) to obtain{∣∣C(n)k ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)k¯ ∣∣}+ n→∞−−−→ {H(V |Y(k))−H(V |Z)}+.
Finally, by combining (58) and (59), we obtain that the rate of S(k) is
1
nL
L∑
i=1
∣∣S(k),i∣∣ = 1nL
L∑
i=1
(∣∣S(V )(k),i∣∣+ ∣∣S(U)(k),i∣∣) n→∞−−−→ H(V U(k)|Z)−H(V U(k)|Y(k)),
which is equal to the rate R?kS(k) defined in (3).
2) Rate of S(k¯). The confidential message S(k¯) is carried entirely in T˜
n
(k¯),1:L
. According to Section IV-B,
if i ∈ [2, L− 1], we have S(U)
(k¯),i
= T˜(k¯),i
[Q(n)0 \ (O(n)k¯ ∪N (n)k¯ ∪M(n)k¯ )]. At Block 1, if k¯ = 1 then
S
(U)
(1),1 = T˜(1),1
[(Q(n)0 ∪Q(n)1 )\ (O(n)1 ∪N (n)1 ∪M(n)1 )] and, otherwise, S(U)(2),1 = T˜(2),1[Q(n)0 ∪Q(n)2 ].
At Block L, if k¯ = 1 then we have S(U)(1),L = T˜(1),L
[Q(n)0 ], while if k¯ = 2 then we have that
S
(U)
(2),L = T˜(2),L
[Q(n)0 \ (O(n)2 ∪N (n)2 ∪M(n)2 )]. Consequently, we obtain
1
nL
L∑
i=1
∣∣S(U)
(k¯),i
∣∣
=
1
n
∣∣Q(n)0 \ (O(n)k¯ ∪N (n)k¯ ∪M(n)k¯ )∣∣+ 1nL ∣∣O(n)k¯ ∪N (n)k¯ ∪M(n)k¯ ∪Q(n)k¯ ∣∣
(a)
=
1
n
(∣∣∣H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z ∩ L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k))C ∩H(n)U(k¯)|V \ L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯)∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k) ∩ (H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z)C \ L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯)∣∣∣− ∣∣M(n)k¯ ∣∣)
+
1
nL
∣∣O(n)
k¯
∪N (n)
k¯
∪M(n)
k¯
∪Q(n)
k¯
∣∣
(b)
≥ 1
n
(∣∣∣H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z ∩ L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z)C \ L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯)∣∣∣− ∣∣M(n)k¯ ∣∣)
+
1
nL
(∣∣∣H(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯)∣∣∣+ ∣∣M(n)k¯ ∣∣)
=
1
n
(∣∣∣H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯))C∣∣∣− ∣∣M(n)k¯ ∣∣)+ 1nL(∣∣∣H(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯)∣∣∣+ ∣∣M(n)k¯ ∣∣)
n→∞−−−→ H(U(k¯)|V U(k)Z)−H(U(k¯)|V Y(k¯))−
(
H(V |Y(k¯))−min{H(V |Y(2)), H(V |Z)}
)
+
1
L
(
H(U(k¯)|V Y(k¯))− (H(V |Y(k¯))−min{H(V |Y(2)), H(V |Z)})
)
L→∞−−−−→ H(U(k¯)|V U(k)Z)−H(U(k¯)|V Y(k¯))−
(
H(V |Y(k¯))−min{H(V |Y(2)), H(V |Z)}
)
,
where (a) holds by the definition of sets in (48)–(53); (b) follows from the fact that sets
(H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k))C∩
H(n)U(k¯)|V and H
(n)
U(k¯)|V U(k) ∩
(H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z)C are disjoint and subsets of (H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z)C, and because
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∣∣O(n)
k¯
∣∣ + ∣∣N (n)
k¯
∣∣ + ∣∣Q(n)
k¯
∣∣ = ∣∣H(n)U(k¯)|V \ L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯)∣∣, which is greater or equal to ∣∣H(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯)∣∣; and
the limit when n goes to infinity follows from applying source polarization [8] and the definition
of M(n)
k¯
. If k¯ = 1, according to (55) we have
∣∣M(n)1 ∣∣ = ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ + ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ if
I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)), whereas
∣∣M(n)1 ∣∣ = ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ if I(V ;Z) > I(V ;Y(2)),
and we have
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ n→∞−−−→ H(V |Y(1))−H(V |Z)),
which follows from (56), while from the partition of H(n)V in (19)–(26) we obtain∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ = ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C ∩ L(n)V |Y(2)∣∣− ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(2))C ∩ L(n)V |Y(1)∣∣
=
∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣− ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(2))C∣∣,
n→∞−−−→ H(V |Y(1))−H(V |Y(2)).
Otherwise, if k¯ = 2, from (54) we have
∣∣M(n)2 ∣∣={∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣}+ and{∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣}+ n→∞−−−→ {H(V |Y(2))−H(V |Z)}+
= H(V |Y(2))−min{H(V |Y(2)), H(V |Z)}.
Therefore, the PCS attains R?kS(k¯) defined in (4).
Private-shared sequence rate
First, from [8] (Section V.A.4), we have that
1
nL
(∣∣κ(V )Θ ∣∣+ ∣∣κ(V )Γ ∣∣+ 2∑
k=1
∣∣κ(V )ΥΦ(k)∣∣) n,L→∞−−−−−→ 0.
If we substitute
∣∣κ(V )Θ ∣∣ by ∣∣κ(V )Ψ ∣∣, it is very easy to prove, by applying similar reasoning, that the overall
length is negligible in terms of rate as well.
If k = 1, we have
∣∣κ(U)Θ ∣∣ = ∣∣J (n)1 ∣∣ and ∣∣κ(U)Ψ ∣∣ = 0, whereas ∣∣κ(U)Θ ∣∣ = 0 and ∣∣κ(U)Ψ ∣∣ = ∣∣B(n)2 ∣∣ if k = 2.
From the definition of J (n)1 and B(n)2 in (43) and (51) respectively, we obtain
1
nL
∣∣κ(U)Θ ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣(L(n)U(1)|V Y(1))C∣∣ n→∞−−−→ 1LH(U(1)|V Y(1)) L→∞−−−−→ 0,
1
nL
∣∣κ(U)Ψ ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣(L(n)U(2)|V Y(2))C∣∣ n→∞−−−→ 1LH(U(2)|V Y(2)) L→∞−−−−→ 0.
where the limit when n goes to infinity follows from applying the source polarization theorem [8].
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Finally, we have
1
nL
2∑
`=1
∣∣κ(U)ΥΦ(`)∣∣+ 1nL ∣∣κ(U)O ∣∣
=
1
nL
(
L
∣∣(H(n)U(k)|V )C \ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k)∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(k)|V \ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k)∣∣)
+
1
nL
(
L
∣∣(H(n)U(k¯)|V )C \ L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯)∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(k¯)|V \ L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯)∣∣)
+
1
nL
(∣∣(H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k))C ∩H(n)U(k¯)|V \ L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯)∣∣)
≤ 1
n
2∑
`=1
∣∣(H(n)U(`)|V )C \ L(n)U(`)|V Y(`)∣∣+ 1nL ∣∣(L(n)U(k)|V Y(k))C∣∣+ 2nL ∣∣(L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯))C∣∣
(a)
≤ 1
n
2∑
`=1
∣∣(H(n)U(`)|V Y(`))C \ L(n)U(`)|V Y(`)∣∣+ 1nL ∣∣(L(n)U(k)|V Y(k))C∣∣+ 2nL ∣∣(L(n)U(k¯)|V Y(k¯))C∣∣
n→∞−−−→ 1
L
(H(U(k)|V Y(k)) + 2H(U(k¯)|V Y(k¯))) L→∞−−−−→ 0,
where (a) holds because H(n)U(`)|V Y(`) ⊃ H
(n)
U(`)|V for any ` ∈ [1, 2]; and the limit when n goes to infinity
follows from applying the source polarization theorem [8].
Therefore, the amount of private-shared information between transmitter and legitimate receivers is
negligible in terms of rate, and so is the rate of the additional transmissions.
Rate of the additional randomness
For i ∈ [1, L], the encoder randomly draws (by SC encoding) the elements A˜i
[(H(n)V )C \ L(n)V ],
T˜(k),i
[(H(n)U(k)|V )C \ L(n)U(k)|V ] and T˜(k¯),i[(H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k))C \ L(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)]. Nevertheless, we have
1
n
(∣∣(H(n)V )C \ L(n)V ∣∣+ ∣∣∣(H(n)U(k)|V )C \ L(n)U(k)|V ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣(H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k))C \ L(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)∣∣∣) n→∞−−−→ 0,
where the limit as n approaches infinity follows from applying source polarization [8].
B. Distribution of the DMS after the polar encoding
For i ∈ [1, L], let q˜Ani Tn(1),iTn(2),i denote the distribution of (A˜ni , T˜n(1),i, T˜n(2),i) after the encoding. The
following lemma, which is based on the results in [10], proves that q˜Ani Tn(1),iTn(2),i and the marginal
distribution pAnTn(1)Tn(2) of the original DMS are nearly statistically indistinguishable for sufficiently large
n and, hence, so are q˜V ni Tn(1),iTn(2),iXni Y n(1),iY n(2),iZni and pV nTn(1)Tn(2)XnY n(1)Y n(2)Zn . This result is crucial for the
reliability and secrecy performance of the polar coding scheme.
September 12, 2019 DRAFT
50
Lemma 1. For any i ∈ [1, L], we obtain
V(q˜Ani Tn(1),iTn(2),i , pAnTn(1)Tn(2)) ≤ δ(∗)n ,
V(q˜V ni Tn(1),iTn(2),iXni Y n(1),iY n(2),iZni , pV nTn(1)Tn(2)XnY n(1)Y n(2)Zn) ≤ δ(∗)n ,
where δ(∗)n , n3
√
2
√
`nδn2 ln 2
(
`n− log
√
`nδn2 ln 2
)
+ δn +
√
3
√
nδn2 ln 2.
Proof. For the first claim, see [1] (Lemma 5) taking M , 3. The second holds because, for all i ∈ [1, L],
sequence X˜ni and X
n
i are deterministic functions of (A˜
n
i , T˜
n
(1),i, T˜
n
(2),i) and (A
n, Tn(1), T
n
(2)) respectively,
and q˜V ni Tn(1),iTn(2),iXni Y n(1),iY n(2),iZni ≡ q˜Xni pY n(1)Y n(2)Zn|Xn .
Remark 11. Consider the PCS operating to achieve the corner point of R(k)MI-WTBC for some k ∈ [1, 2]. In
this case, O(U)
(k¯),i
⊂ T˜(k¯),i
[(H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k))C ∩H(n)U(k¯)|V ] is repeated, for i ∈ [2, L], in T˜n(k¯),i−1 (if k¯ = 1) or,
for i ∈ [1, L− 1], in T˜n
(k¯),i+1
(if k¯ = 2). In both situations, O(U)
(k¯),i
is drawn by performing SC encoding
and is repeated in some of the elements of the corresponding adjacent block whose indices correspond to
H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z . Nevertheless, O
(U)
(k¯),i
is not repeated directly, but the encoder copies O¯(U)
(k¯),i
= O
(U)
(k¯),i
⊕ κ(U)O
(see Figure 9 and Figure 10). Hence, notice that κ(U)O ensures that O¯
(U)
(k¯),i
is uniformly distributed.
C. Reliability analysis
Consider that the PCS must achieve (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ⊂ R(k)MI-WTBC. In this section we prove
that Receiver k is able to reconstruct (W(k), S(k)) with arbitrary small error probability, while Receiver k¯
is able to reconstruct (W(k¯), S(k¯)). Recall that the inner-layer A˜
n
1:L and the outer-layer T˜
n
(k),1:L carry
(W(k), S(k)), and the outer-layer T˜n(k¯),1:L carries (W(k¯), S(k¯)). Although A˜
n
1:L only contains information
intended for Receiver k, the other receiver must reliably reconstruct them in order to be able to decode
T˜n
(k¯),1:L
.
Consider the probability of incorrectly decoding
(
A˜n1:L, T˜
n
(1),1:L
)
at Receiver ` ∈ [1, 2]. For i ∈ [1, L],
let q˜V ni Tn(`),iY n(`),i and pV nTn(`)Y n(`) be marginals of q˜V ni Tn(1),iTn(2),iXni Y n(1),iY n(2),iZni and pV nTn(1)Tn(2)XnY n(1)Y n(2)Zn
respectively, and define an optimal coupling [11] (Proposition 4.7) between q˜V ni Tn(`),iY n(`),i and pV nTn(`)Y n(`)
such that P
[EV ni Tn(`),iY n(`),i] = V(q˜V ni Tn(`),iY n(`),i , pV nTn(`)Y n(`)), where EV ni Tn(`),iY n(`),i , {(V˜ ni , Tn(`), Y˜ n(`),i) 6=(
V n, Tn(`), Y
n
(`)
)}
. Additionally, define
E(`),i,
{(
Aˆ(`),i
[(L(n)V |Y(`))C], Tˆ(`),i[(L(n)U(`)|V Y(`))C]) 6=(A˜i[(L(n)V |Y(`))C], T˜(`),i[(L(n)U(`)|V Y(`))C])}.
Recall that (Υ(V )(`) ,Φ
(V )
(`),1:L) and (Υ
(U)
(`) ,Φ
(U)
(`),1:L) is available to legitimate Receiver `. Thus, P[E(1),1] =
P[E(2),L] = 0 because given (Υ(V )(1) ,Φ
(V )
(1),1:L) and (Υ
(U)
(1) ,Φ
(U)
(1),1:L) Receiver 1 knows A˜1
[(L(n)V |Y(1))C]
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and T˜(1),1
[(L(n)U(1)|V Y(1))C], while given (Υ(V )(2) ,Φ(V )(2),1:L) and (Υ(U)(2) ,Φ(U)(2),1:L) legitimate Receiver 2 knows
A˜L
[(L(n)V |Y(2))C] and T˜(2),L[(L(n)U(2)|V Y(2))C]. Furthermore, due to the chaining structure, recall that we
have
(
A˜i
[(L(n)V |Y(1))C], T˜(1),i[(L(n)U(1)|V Y(1))C]) ⊂ (A˜ni−1, T˜n(1),i−1) for i ∈ [2, L]. Therefore, at legitimate
Receiver 1, for i ∈ [2, L] we have
P[E(1),i] ≤ P
[(
A˜ni−1, T˜
n
(1),i−1
)]
. (60)
Similarly, we have seen that
(
A˜i
[(L(n)V |Y(2))C], T˜(2),i[(L(n)U(2)|V Y(2))C]) ⊂ (A˜ni+1, T˜n(2),i+1) for i ∈ [1, L−1].
Thus, at legitimate Receiver 2, for i ∈ [1, L− 1] we obtain
P[E(2),i] ≤ P
[(
A˜ni+1, T˜
n
(2),i+1
)]
. (61)
Hence, the probability of incorrectly decoding
(
A˜ni , T˜
n
(`),i
)
at the Receiver ` ∈ [1, 2] is
P
[(
Aˆn(`),i, Tˆ
n
(`),i
) 6= (A˜ni , T˜n(`),i)]
= P
[(
Aˆn(`),i, Tˆ
n
(`),i
) 6= (A˜ni , T˜n(`),i)∣∣ECV ni U(`)Y n(`),i ∩ EC(`),i]P[ECV ni U(`)Y n(`),i ∩ EC(`),i]
+ P
[(
Aˆn(`),i, Tˆ
n
(`),i
) 6= (A˜ni , T˜n(`),i)∣∣EV ni U(`)Y n(`),i ∪ E(`),i]P[EV ni U(`)Y n(`),i ∪ E(`),i]
≤ P
[(
Aˆn(`),i, Tˆ
n
(`),i
) 6= (A˜ni , T˜n(`),i)∣∣ECV ni U(`)Y n(`),i ∩ EC(`),i]+ P[EV ni U(`)Y n(`),i]+ P[E(`),i]
(a)
≤ 2δn + P
[EV ni U(`)Y n(`),i]+ P[E(`),i]
(b)
≤ 2δn + δ(∗)n + P
[E(`),i]
(c)
≤ i(2δn + δ(∗)n )
where (a) holds by [8] (Theorem 2); (b) follows from the optimal coupling and Lemma 1; and (c) holds
by induction and (60)–(61). Therefore, by the union bound, we obtain
P
[
(W(`),1:L, S(`),1:L) 6= (Wˆ(`),1:L, Sˆ(`),1:L)
] ≤ L∑
i=1
P
[(
Aˆn(`),i, Tˆ
n
(`),i
) 6= (A˜ni , T˜n(`),i)]
≤ L(L+ 1)
2
(
2nδn + δ
(∗)
n
)
,
and, consequently, for sufficiently large n the PCS satisfies the reliability condition in (1).
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D. Secrecy analysis
Since the encoding of Section IV takes place over L blocks of size n, we need to prove that
lim
n→∞ I
(
S(1),1:LS(2),1:L; Z˜
n
1:L
)
= 0.
Consider that the PCS operates to achieve (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ⊂ R(k)MI-WTBC, where k ∈ [1, 2].
For any i ∈ [1, L], the confidential message S(k),i is stored in A˜i
[H(n)V |Z] and T˜(k),i[H(n)U(k)|V Z], and S(k¯),i
is stored in T˜(k¯),i
[H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k¯)Z]. Hence, the following lemma shows that strong secrecy holds for any
Block i ∈ [1, L].
Lemma 2. For any i ∈ [1, L] and sufficiently large n, we have
I
(
A˜i
[H(n)V |Z]T˜(k),i[H(n)U(k)|V Z]T˜(k¯),i[H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z]; Z˜ni ) ≤ δ(S)n ,
where δ(S)n , 3nδn + 2δ(∗)n
(
3n− log δ(∗)n
)
and δ(∗)n is defined as in Lemma 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The following step is to prove asymptotically statistically independence between eavesdropper’s ob-
servations from Blocks 1 to L. We address this part slightly differently depending on whether the PCS
must achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC or R
(2)
MI-WTBC.
Secrecy analysis when polar code operates to achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC
For convenience and with slight abuse of notation, for i ∈ [1, L] let R˜n(1),i ,
(
A˜ni , T˜
n
(1),i
)
, which
carries W(1),i ,
[
W
(V )
(1),i,W
(U)
(1),i
]
and S(1),i ,
[
S
(V )
(1),i, S
(U)
(1),i
]
. According to the previous encoding, we have
W
(V )
(1),i = A˜i
[C(n)] and W (U)(1),i = T˜(1),i[J (n)0 ∪J (n)1 ]. Therefore, we define W(1),i , [W ′(1),i,W ′′(1),i], where
W ′(1),i ,
[
W
′(V )
(1),i ,W
′(U)
(1),i
]
, being W ′(V )(1),i = A˜i
[C(n)1 ∪ C(n)1,2 ] and W ′(U)(1),i = T˜(1),i[J (n)1 ]. Then, W ′′(1),i ,[
W
′′(V )
(1),i ,W
′′(U)
(1),i
]
, being W ′′(V )(1),i = A˜i
[C(n)0 ∪C(n)2 ] and W ′′(U)(1),i = T˜(1),i[J (n)0 ]. Recall that, for i ∈ [1, L−1],
an encrypted version of W ′(1),i+1, namely Ω¯(1),i+1 ,
[
Θ¯
(V )
i+1, Γ¯
(V )
i+1, Θ¯
(U)
(1),i+1
]
, is repeated in R˜n(1),i. In fact,
from A˜ni+1, recall that sequence ∆
(V )
(1),i+1 =
[
Θ¯
(V )
3,i+1, Γ¯
(V )
3,i+1
] ⊆ Ω¯(1),i+1 is repeated in T˜n(1),i but now this
dependency appears implicitly. Furthermore, for i ∈ [1, L] define Ξ(1),i ,
[
Ψ
(V )
i ,Γ
(V )
i ,Π
(V )
(2),i,Λi,Λ
(U)
(1),i
]
,
which denotes the entire sequence depending on R˜n(1),i that is repeated in R˜
n
(1),i+1 if i ∈ [1, L− 1].
Finally, for i ∈ [1, L] we have T˜n(2),i that carries W(2),i and S(2),i. For convenience, define Ξ(2),i ,[
Ψ
(U)
(2),i,Λ
(U)
(2),i
]
, which, together with O¯(U)(2),i, will be repeated in T˜
n
(2),i+1 if i ∈ [1, L− 1].
According to these previous definitions and setting κΩ , [κ(V )Θ , κ
(V )
Γ , κ
(U)
Θ ], notice that Figure 11
represents a Bayesian graph that describes the dependencies between the variables involved in the PCS
of Section IV when it operates to achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC.
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Although we have seen that the PCS introduces bidirectional dependencies, we have reformulated
the encoding to obtain that they take place forward only. To do so, additionally we regard Ω¯(1),i as an
independent random sequence generated at Block i− 1 and properly stored in R˜ni−1. Then, by using κΩ,
the encoder obtains W ′(1),i that is repeated in Block i.
W 0(1),i
W 00(1),i
 
(V )
(2),i
S(1),i
R˜n(1),i
T˜n(2),i
O¯
(U)
(2),i
W(2),i
S(2),i
Z˜ni
⌅(1),i
⌅(2),i
W 0(1),i+1
W 00(1),i+1
S(1),i+1
W(2),i+1
S(2),i+1
Z˜ni+1Z˜
n
i 1
O¯
(U)
(2),i 1
⌅(2),i 1
⌅(1),i 1
 
(V )
(2),i 1
T˜n(2),i 1
W(2),i 1
S(2),i 1
S(1),i 1
W 0(1),i 1
W 00(1),i 1
R˜n(1),i 1 R˜
n
(1),i+1
⌅(1),i 2
⌅(2),i 2
 
(V )
(2),i 2
O¯
(U)
(2),i 2
⌦

(U)
O
Block i  1 Block i Block i + 1
⌦¯(1),i+1 ⌦¯(1),i+2⌦¯(1),i
T˜n(2),i+1
Fig. 11. Graphical representation (Bayesian graph) of the dependencies between random variables involved in the PCS when
it operates to achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC. Independent random variables are indicated by white nodes, whereas those
that are dependent are indicated by gray nodes.
The following lemma shows that eavesdropper observations Z˜ni are asymptotically statistically inde-
pendent of observations Z˜n1:i−1 from previous blocks.
Lemma 3. For any i ∈ [2, L] and sufficiently large n, we have
I
(
S(1),1:LS(2),1:LZ˜
n
1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
) ≤ δ(S)n ,
where δ(S)n is defined as in Lemma 2.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Therefore, we obtain
I
(
S(1),1:LS(2),1:L; Z˜
n
1:L
)
= I
(
S(1),1:LS(2),1:L; Z˜
n
1
)
+
L∑
i=2
I
(
S(1),1:LS(2),1:L; Z˜
n
i
∣∣Z˜n1:i−1)
(a)
≤ I(S(1),1:LS(2),1:L; Z˜n1 )+ (L− 1)δ(S)n
(b)
≤ Lδ(S)n ,
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where (a) holds by Lemma 3; and (b) holds by independence between S2:L and any random variable
from Block 1, and from applying Lemma 2 to bound I(S(1),1S(2),1; Z˜n1 ).
Thus, for sufficiently large n, the PCS satisfies the strong secrecy condition in (2).
Secrecy analysis when polar code operates to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC
Now, for convenience and with slight abuse of notation, for i ∈ [1, L] let R˜n(2),i ,
(
A˜ni , T˜
n
(2),i
)
, which
carries W(2),i ,
[
W
(V )
(2),i,W
(U)
(2),i
]
and S(2),i ,
[
S
(V )
(2),i, S
(U)
(2),i
]
. According to the previous encoding, we
have W (V )(2),i = A˜i
[C(n)] and W (U)(2),i = T˜(2),i[J (n)0 ∪J (n)2 ]. Therefore, we define W(2),i , [W ′(2),i,W ′′(2),i],
where W ′(2),i ,
[
W
′(V )
(2),i ,W
′(U)
(2),i
]
, being W ′(V )(2),i = A˜i
[C(n)2 ∪ C(n)1,2 ] and W ′(U)(2),i = T˜(2),i[J (n)2 ]. Then,
W ′′(2),i ,
[
W
′′(V )
(2),i ,W
′′(U)
(2),i
]
, being W ′′(V )(2),i = A˜i
[C(n)0 ∪ C(n)2 ] and W ′′(U)(2),i = T˜(2),i[J (n)0 ]. Recall that, for
i ∈ [2, L], now an encrypted version of W ′(2),i−1, namely Ω¯(2),i−1 ,
[
Ψ¯
(V )
i−1, Γ¯
(V )
i−1, Ψ¯
(U)
(2),i−1
]
, is repeated
in R˜n(2),i. Indeed, ∆
(V )
(2),i−1 =
[
Ψ¯
(V )
3,i−1, Γ¯
(V )
3,i−1
] ⊆ Ω¯(2),i−1 is repeated in T˜n(2),i, and now this dependency
appears implicitly.
Recall that, for i ∈ [1, L − 1], Π(V )(2),i = A˜i
[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ], which contains part of S(V )(2),i, is repeated
in A˜i+1
[R(n)S ], while Λ(V )1 = A˜1[R(n)Λ ], which contains part of S(V )(2),1, is replicated in A˜2:L[R(n)Λ ]. For
convenience, now we would like to have backward dependencies only. Therefore, we can consider that
S
′(V )
(2),1 = A˜1
[(I(n)∪G(n)1 )\ (R(n)Λ ∪R(n)S )], for i ∈ [2, L−1] then S′(V )(2),i = A˜i[(I(n) \G(n)2 )∪R(n)S ], and
S
′(V )
(2),L = A˜i
[I(n)∪R(n)S ∪R(n)Λ ]. Then, for i ∈ [2, L], we have that Π′(V )(2),i = A˜i[I(n)∩R(n)S ] and Λ′(V )i =
A˜i
[R(n)Λ ] are repeated in A˜i−1[(I(n)∩G(n)2 )∪R(n)Λ ]. Similarly, we can regard S′(U)(2),1 = T˜(2),1[F (n)0 ], for
i ∈ [2, L−1] then S′(U)(2),i = S
(U)
(2),i = T˜(2),i
[F (n)0 \(D(n)2 ∪L(n)2 ∪O(n)2 )], and S′(U)(2),L = T˜(2),L[F (n)0 ∪F (n)2 ].
Then, for i ∈ [2, L], we can consider that Λ′(U)(2),i = T˜(2),i
[F (n)2 ] is repeated in T˜(2),i−1[F (n)2 ]. Therefore,
for i ∈ [1, L − 1] we define Ξ(2),i+1 ,
[
Θ
(V )
i+1,Γ
(V )
i+1,Π
′(V )
(2),i+1,Λ
′(V )
i+1 ,Λ
′(U)
(2),i+1
]
, which denotes the entire
sequence depending on R˜n(2),i+1 that is repeated in R˜
n
(2),i.
Finally, we have T˜n(1),i that carries W(1),i and S(1),i. Now, for i ∈ [1, L − 1], we regard S
′(U)
(1),i =
T˜(1),i
[Q(n)0 \ (N (n)1 ∪M(n)1 ∪O(n)1 )], and S′(U)(1),L = T˜(1),L[Q(n)0 ∪Q(n)1 ]. Then, for i ∈ [2, L] we consider
that Λ′(U)i = T˜(1),i
[Q(n)1 ] is repeated in T˜(1),i−1[Q(n)1 ]. Thus, we define Ξ(1),i , [Θ(U)(1),i,Λ′(U)(1),i], which,
together with O¯(U)(1),i, will be repeated in T˜
n
(1),i−1 if i ∈ [2, L]. Also, define 	
(V )
(1),i ,
[
∆
(V )
(1),i,Π
(V )
(1),i
]
, which
denotes the part of A˜ni that is repeated in T˜
n
(1),i−1.
According to these previous definitions and setting κΩ , [κ(V )Ψ , κ
(V )
Γ , κ
(U)
Ψ ], notice that Figure 12
represents a Bayesian graph that describes the dependencies between the variables involved in the PCS
of Section IV when it operate to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC.
In order to obtain that dependencies take place backward only, we regard Ω¯(2),i, for i ∈ [2, L], as an
independent random sequence that is generated at Block i− 1 and is properly stored in R˜n(2),i−1. Then,
by using κΩ, the encoder obtains W ′(2),i that is repeated in Block i.
The following lemma shows that eavesdropper observations Z˜ni are asymptotically statistically inde-
pendent of observations Z˜ni+1:L from previous blocks.
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W 0(2),i
W 00(2),i
R˜n(2),i
T˜n(1),i
W(1),i
Z˜ni
⌅(2),i
⌅(1),i
W 0(2),i+1
W 00(2),i+1
W(1),i+1
Z˜ni+1Z˜
n
i 1
⌅(1),i+1
⌅(2),i+1
T˜n(1),i 1
W(1),i 1
W 0(2),i 1
W 00(2),i 1
R˜n(2),i 1 R˜n(2),i+1
⌦

(U)
O
Block i  1 Block i Block i + 1
⌦¯(2),i 1⌦¯(2),i 2 ⌦¯(2),i
T˜n(1),i+1
O¯
(U)
(1),i+1
 (V )(1),i+1
S0(2),i+1S0(2),i
 (V )(1),i
O¯
(U)
(1),i
S0(2),i 1
O¯
(U)
(1),i+2
⌅(1),i+2
 (V )(1),i+2
⌅(2),i+2
S0(1),i+1S
0
(1),iS0(1),i 1
Fig. 12. Graphical representation (Bayesian graph) of the dependencies between random variables involved in the PCS when
it operates to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC. Independent random variables are indicated by white nodes, whereas those
that are dependent are indicated by gray nodes.
Lemma 4. For any i ∈ [1, L− 1] and sufficiently large n, we have
I
(
S(1),1:LS(2),1:LZ˜
n
i+1:L; Z˜
n
i
) ≤ δ(S)n ,
where δ(S)n is defined as in Lemma 2.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Therefore, we obtain
I
(
S(1),1:LS(2),1:L; Z˜
n
1:L
)
= I
(
S(1),1:LS(2),1:L; Z˜
n
L
)
+
L−1∑
i′=1
I
(
S(1),1:LS(2),1:L; Z˜
n
L−i′
∣∣Z˜nL−i′+1:L)
(a)
≤ I(S(1),1:LS(2),1:L; Z˜nL)+ (L− 1)δ(S)n
(b)
≤ Lδ(S)n
where (a) holds by Lemma 4; and (b) holds by independence between S1:L−1 and any random variable
from Block L, and from applying Lemma 2 to bound I(S(1),LS(2),L; Z˜nL).
Thus, for sufficiently large n, the PCS satisfies the strong secrecy condition in (2).
Remark 12. For i ∈ [1, L], recall that O(U)(1),i is not generated independently, but drawn by using SC
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encoding. Hence, if the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC, we only can obtain a
causal Bayesian graph by reformulating the encoding so that dependencies between blocks take place
place backward only.
Remark 13. We conjecture that the use κ(V )Ω is not needed for the PCS to satisfy the strong secrecy
condition when operates to achieve any of the corner points. However, the key is required in order to
prove this condition by means of analyzing a causal Bayesian graph.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A strongly secure PCS has been proposed for the WTBC with two legitimate receivers and one
eavesdropper. We have compared two inner-bounds on the achievable region of the MI-WTBC model,
where a transmitter wants to send different information (private and confidential) intended for each
receiver. Then, we have provided a polar code that achieves the inner-bound that is strictly larger
for a particular input distribution. The only difference between the random coding techniques used to
characterize the two bounds is the decoding strategy: joint decoding in the stronger inner-bound, and
successive decoding in the other.
Our scheme uses polar-based Marton’s coding, which requires three encoding layers: one inner-layer
that must be reliably decoded by both receivers, and two outer-layers associated to each legitimate receiver.
Due to the non-degradedness assumption of the channel, the encoder builds a chaining construction that
induces bidirectional dependencies between adjacent blocks, which need to be taken carefully into account
in the secrecy analysis.
In order to achieve the larger inner-bound for a particular distribution, the chaining construction must
repeat some elements from the inner-layer to the outer-layers of adjacent blocks, and turns out that this
cross-dependency between encoding layers makes the use of polar-based joint decoding crucial. As in [1],
the use of a negligible secret-key is required to prove that eavesdropper’s observations for different blocks
are statistically independent of one another, which is necessary to show that the polar code satisfies the
strong secrecy condition. Furthermore, now the PCS needs to use another secret-key that also becomes
negligible in terms of rate as the number of blocks grows indefinitely. This key is required to randomize
a non-negligible set of elements of one outer-layer that are drawn by means of SC encoding and are
needed by the corresponding receiver. In this way, the chaining construction can repeat these elements
in adjacent blocks without causing a significant distortion on the input distribution.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
For n sufficiently large, we have
I
(
A˜i
[H(n)V |Z]T˜(k),i[H(n)U(k)|V Z]T˜(k¯),i[H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z]; Z˜ni )
≤ ∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z∣∣
−H(A˜i[H(n)V |Z]T˜(k),i[H(n)U(k)|V Z]T˜(k¯),i[H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z]∣∣Z˜ni )
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(a)
≤ ∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z∣∣
−H(A[H(n)V |Z]T(k)[H(n)U(k)|V Z]T(k¯)[H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z]∣∣Zn)+ 6nδ(∗)n − 2δ(∗)n log δ(∗)n
(b)
≤ 3nδn + 6nδ(∗)n − 2δ(∗)n log δ(∗)n
where (a) holds by [1] (Lemma 6) (where M , 3 and O , 1) and Lemma 1; and (b) because
H
(
A
[H(n)V |Z]T(k)[H(n)U(k)|V Z]T(k¯)[H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z]∣∣Zn)
≥ H(A[H(n)V |Z]∣∣Zn)+H(T(k)[H(n)U(k)|V Z]∣∣V nZn)+H(T(k¯)[H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z]∣∣V nUn(k)Zn)
≥
∑
j∈H(n)V |Z
H
(
A(j)
∣∣A1:j−1Zn)+ ∑
j∈H(n)T(k)|V Z
H
(
T(k)(j)
∣∣T 1:j−1(k) V nZn)
+
∑
j∈H(n)T(k¯)|V U(k)Z
H
(
T(k¯)(j)
∣∣T 1:j−1
(k¯)
V nTn(k)Z
n
)
≥ ∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣(1− δn) + ∣∣H(n)T(k)|V Z∣∣(1− δn) + ∣∣H(n)T(k¯)|V T(k¯)Z∣∣(1− δn)
where we have used the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy, the invertibility of Gn, and the
definition of H(n)V |Z , H
(n)
T(k)|V Z and H
(n)
T(k¯)|V T(k¯)Z in (9), (13) and (17) respectively.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
For any i ∈ [2, L] and sufficiently large n, we have
I
(
S(1),1:LS(2),1:LZ˜
n
1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
)
= I
(
S(1),1:iS(2),1:iZ˜
n
1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
)
+ I
(
S(1),i+1:LS(2),i+i:L; Z˜
n
i
∣∣S(1),1:i−1S(2),1:i−1Z˜n1:i−1)
(a)
= I
(
S(1),1:iS(2),1:iZ˜
n
1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
)
≤ I(S(1),1:iS(2),1:iZ˜n1:i−1Ξ(1),i−1∆(V )(2),i−1Ξ(2),i−1O¯(U)(2),i−1; Z˜ni )
= I
(
S(1),iS(2),iΞ(1),i−1∆
(V )
(2),i−1Ξ(2),i−1O¯
(U)
(2),i−1; Z˜
n
i
)
+ I
(
S(1),1:i−1S(2),1:i−1Z˜n1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
∣∣S(1),iS(2),iZ˜n1:i−1Ξ(1),i−1∆(V )(2),i−1Ξ(2),i−1O¯(U)(2),i−1)
(b)
≤ δ(S)n + I
(
S(1),1:i−1S(2),1:i−1Z˜n1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
∣∣S(1),iS(2),iZ˜n1:i−1Ξ(1),i−1∆(V )(2),i−1Ξ(2),i−1O¯(U)(2),i−1)
(c)
= δ(S)n + I
(
S(1),1:i−1S(2),1:i−1Z˜n1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
∣∣Bi−1)
≤ δ(S)n + I
(
S(1),1:i−1S(2),1:i−1Z˜n1:i−1; Z˜
n
i W
′
(1),i
∣∣Bi−1)
= δ(S)n + I
(
S(1),1:i−1S(2),1:i−1Z˜n1:i−1;W
′
(1),i
∣∣Bi−1)
+ I
(
S(1),1:i−1S(2),1:i−1Z˜n1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
∣∣Bi−1W ′(1),i)
(d)
= δ(S)n + I
(
S(1),1:i−1S(2),1:i−1Z˜n1:i−1;W
′
(1),i
∣∣Bi−1)
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≤ δ(S)n + I
(
R˜(1),1:i−1S(2),1:i−1; Z˜n1:i−1W
′
(1),i
∣∣Bi−1)
= δ(S)n + I
(
R˜(1),1:i−1S(2),1:i−1;W ′(1),i
∣∣Bi−1)+ I(Z˜n1:i−1;W ′(1),i∣∣Bi−1R˜(1),1:i−1S(2),1:i−1)
(e)
= δ(S)n + I
(
R˜(1),1:i−1S(2),1:i−1;W ′(1),i
∣∣Bi−1)
= δ(S)n + I
(
R˜(1),1:i−1S(2),1:i−1; Ω¯(1),i ⊕ κ(V )Ω
∣∣Bi−1)
(f)
= δ(S)n
where (a) holds by independence between (S(1),i+1:L, S(2),i+1:L) and any random variable from Blocks 1 to i;
(b) holds by Lemma 2 because, according to Section IV, we have[
S(1),iS(2),iΞ(1),i−1∆
(V )
(2),i−1Ξ(2),i−1O¯
(U)
(2),i−1
]
=
[
A˜i
[H(n)V |Z]T˜(1),i[H(n)U(k)|V Z]T˜(2),i[H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z]];
in (c) we have defined Bi−1 ,
[
S(1),iS(2),iΞ(1),i−1∆
(V )
(2),i−1Ξ(2),i−1O¯
(U)
(2),i−1
]
; (d) follows from applying d-
separation [12] over the Bayesian graph in Figure 11 to obtain that Z˜ni and (S(1),1:i−1S(2),1:i−1Z˜
n
1:i−1) are
conditionally independent given
(
Bi−1,W ′(1),i
)
; (e) also follows from applying d-separation to obtain
that W ′(1),i and Z˜
n
1:i−1 are conditionally independent given (Bi−1, R˜(1),1:i−1, S(2),1:i−1); and (f) holds
because Ω¯(V )(1),i is independent of Bi−1, S(2),1:i−1 and any random variable from Block 1 to (i− 2), and
because from applying crypto-lemma [13] we obtain that Ω¯(V )(1),i ⊕ κ
(V )
Ω is independent of R˜
n
(1),i−1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
For any i ∈ [2, L] and sufficiently large n, we have
I
(
S(1),1:LS(2),1:LZ˜
n
i+1:L; Z˜
n
i
)
= I
(
S′(1),1:LS
′
(2),1:LZ˜
n
i+1:L; Z˜
n
i
)
= I
(
S′(1),i:LS
′
(2),i:LZ˜
n
i+1:L; Z˜
n
i
)
+ I
(
S′(1),1:i−1S
′
(2),1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
∣∣S′(1),i:LS′(2),i:LZ˜ni+1:L)
(a)
= I
(
S′(1),i:LS
′
(2),i:LZ˜
n
i+1:L; Z˜
n
i
)
≤ I(S′(1),i:LS′(2),i:LZ˜ni+1:LΞ(2),i+1	(1),i+1,Ξ(1),i+1O¯(U)(1),i+1; Z˜ni )
= I
(
S′(1),iS
′
(2),iΞ(2),i+1	(1),i+1,Ξ(1),i+1O¯(U)(1),i+1; Z˜ni
)
+ I
(
S′(1),i+1:LS
′
(2),i+1:LZ˜
n
i+1:L; Z˜
n
i
∣∣S′(1),iS′(2),iΞ(2),i+1	(1),i+1,Ξ(1),i+1O¯(U)(1),i+1)
(b)
≤ δ(S)n + I
(
S′(1),i+1:LS
′
(2),i+1:LZ˜
n
i+1:L; Z˜
n
i
∣∣S′(1),iS′(2),iΞ(2),i+1	(1),i+1,Ξ(1),i+1O¯(U)(1),i+1)
(c)
= δ(S)n + I
(
S′(1),i+1:LS
′
(2),i+1:LZ˜
n
i+1:L; Z˜
n
i
∣∣Bi+1)
≤ δ(S)n + I
(
S′(1),i+1:LS
′
(2),i+1:LZ˜
n
i+1:L; Z˜
n
i W
′
(2),i
∣∣Bi+1)
= δ(S)n + I
(
S′(1),i+1:LS
′
(2),i+1:LZ˜
n
i+1:L;W
′
(2),i
∣∣Bi+1)
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+ I
(
S′(1),i+1:LS
′
(2),i+1:LZ˜
n
i+1:L; Z˜
n
i
∣∣Bi+1W ′(2),i)
(d)
= δ(S)n + I
(
S′(1),i+1:LS
′
(2),i+1:LZ˜
n
i+1:L;W
′
(2),i
∣∣Bi+1)
≤ δ(S)n + I
(
R˜(2),i+1:LS
′
(1),i+1:LZ˜
n
i+1:L;W
′
(2),i
∣∣Bi+1)
= δ(S)n + I
(
R˜(2),i+1:LS
′
(1),i+1:L;W
′
(2),i
∣∣Bi+1)+ I(Z˜ni+1:L;W ′(2),i∣∣Bi+1R˜(2),i+1:LS′(1),i+1:L)
(e)
= δ(S)n + I
(
R˜(2),i+1:LS
′
(1),i+1:L;W
′
(2),i
∣∣Bi+1)
= δ(S)n + I
(
R˜(2),i+1:LS
′
(1),i+1:L; Ω¯(2),i ⊕ κΩ
∣∣Bi+1)
(f)
= δ(S)n
where (a) holds by independence between (S′(1),1:i−1, S
′
(2),1:i−1) and any random variable from Blocks i+
1 to L; (b) holds by Lemma 2 because[
S′(1),iS
′
(2),iΞ(2),i+1	(1),i+1,Ξ(1),i+1O¯(U)(1),i+1
]
=
[
A˜i
[H(n)V |Z]T˜(2),i[H(n)U(k)|V Z]T˜(1),i[H(n)U(k¯)|V U(k)Z]];
in (c) we have defined Bi+1 ,
[
S′(1),iS
′
(2),iΞ(2),i+1	(1),i+1,Ξ(1),i+1O¯
(U)
(1),i+1
]
; (d) follows from applying
d-separation [12] over the Bayesian graph in Figure 12 to obtain that Z˜ni and (S
′
(1),i+1:LS
′
(2),i+1:LZ˜
n
i+1:L)
are conditionally independent given
(
Bi+1,W
′
(2),i
)
; (e) also follows from applying d-separation to obtain
that (W ′(2),i and Z˜
n
i+1:L are conditionally independent given (Bi+1, R˜(2),i+1:L, S
′
(1),i+1:L); and (f) holds
because Ω¯(V )(2),i is independent of Bi+1, S(1),1:i−1 and any random variable from Block i + 1 to L, and
because from applying crypto-lemma [13] we obtain that Ω¯(V )(2),i ⊕ κ
(V )
Ω is independent of R˜
n
(2),i+1.
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